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Abstract
This paper studies the multidimensional nature of investments in children within a dynamic frame-
work. In particular, we examine the roles of parental time investments, purchased home goods/services
inputs, and market-based child care services. We first document strong increases in total investment
expenditures by maternal education; yet expenditure shares, which skew heavily towards parental time,
vary little with parental schooling. Second, we develop an intergenerational lifecycle model with mul-
tiple child investment inputs to study these patterns and the impacts of policies that alter the prices
of different inputs. We analytically characterize investment behavior, focusing on the substitutability
of different investment inputs and the way parental skills affect the productivity of family-based in-
puts. Third, we develop an estimation strategy that exploits intratemporal optimality conditions based
on relative demand to estimate substitutability between inputs, the relative productivity of different
inputs, and the role played by parental education. This approach requires no assumptions about the
dynamics of skill investment, preferences, or credit markets. We also account for mismeasured inputs
and wages, as well as unobserved heterogeneity in parenting skills. We further show how noisy measures
of child achievement (measured several years apart) can also be incorporated in a generalized method
of moments approach to additionally identify the dynamics of skill accumulation. Fourth, we use data
from the Child Development Supplement of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to estimate the skill
production technology for children ages 12 and younger. Our estimates suggest complementarity be-
tween parental time and home goods/services inputs as well as between these family-based inputs and
market-based child care, with elasticities of substitution ranging from 0.2 to 0.5. We find no system-
atic effects of parental education on the relative productivity of parental time and other home inputs.
Finally, we use counterfactual simulations to explore the extent and sources of variation in investments
across families, as well as investment responses to changes in input prices. We find that variation in
prices explains 48% of the overall variance in investment expenditures, and differences in wages explain
more than half of the investment expenditure gap between college-educated and non-college-educated
parents. We further show that accounting for the degree of input complementarity implied by our
estimates has important implications for the responses of individual inputs to any price change and for
the responses in total investments and skill accumulation to large (but not small) price changes.
∗For helpful suggestions, we thank Nail Kashaev, Roy Allen, Salvador Navarro, and David Rivers. For excellent research
assistance, we thank Mauricio Torres Ferro, Tom Trivieri, and Han Yu. We are also grateful to Kristina Haynie of Child
Care Aware of America for providing us with a digital compendium of child care prices from all annual reports. Caucutt and
Lochner acknowledge generous research support from SSHRC. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and
do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of Canada.
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1 Introduction
Parents spend their own time and money at home investing in their children’s human capital. Many
also make substantial investments through market-based child care services. A wide range of government
policies impact these investment decisions. For example, welfare policies with work requirements or
that claw back gains from working, as well as the general structure of income taxation, distort parental
time investment margins. Subsidies for sports and arts programs, along with publicly provided goods like
libraries, favor family-based goods investments, while child care incentives favor market-based investments
in children. The welfare and child development impacts of these policies depend on how families respond by
adjusting their investment profiles across inputs within periods and over time. These adjustments depend
critically on how family-based investments (time and goods/services) interact, how parental human capital
affects the productivity of those investments, and how family-based investments interact with market-based
child care.
Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008) document that higher-educated mothers spend more time caring
for their children than do lower-educated mothers. This is surprising at first, because more-educated
mothers work more and face a higher opportunity cost of time for other activities. However, the produc-
tivity of a mother’s time in child investment may also increase with her human capital (Del Boca, Flinn,
and Wiswall, 2014; Brilli, 2015). This not only suggests the importance of accounting for maternal skills
in child production, but it also highlights the importance of accounting for leisure (or non-child care home
production) in addition to time spent investing in children and working in the labor market.1 Much of
the literature abstracts from this additional margin, while other studies (Bernal, 2008; Bernal and Keane,
2010, 2011) assume that all of children’s time is allocated to investment either at home or in child care
facilities.
The literature estimating human capital production functions for children has either focused on dy-
namic interactions of investments over time (Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach,
2010; Cunha, Elo, and Culhane, 2013; Del Bono et al., 2016; Pavan, 2016; Agostinelli and Wiswall, 2020;
Attanasio et al., 2017; Caucutt and Lochner, 2020), typically reducing investment each period to a single
composite input, or has imposed assumptions about the substitutability between time and goods invest-
ments (Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall, 2014, 2016; Brilli, 2015; Lee and Seshadri, 2019; Mullins, 2019;
Attanasio et al., 2020) or between home and child care environments (Griffen, 2019; Chaparro, Sojourner,
and Wiswall, 2020). Exceptions include papers that estimate substitutability between time and goods
1See Domeij and Klein (2013), Bick (2016), and Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (Forthcoming) for related research that
abstracts from children’s human capital accumulation but examines the role child care policies play in parental labor supply.
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(Abbott, 2020) or time and child care (Moschini, 2020).2 An important remaining challenge is to consider
a technology that jointly characterizes patterns of substitution for time and purchased goods/services at
home, as well as child care purchased from the market. Our theoretical and quantitative analyses demon-
strate that all of these components are important for understanding cross-sectional patterns in the data
as well as responses to changes in market prices and policies.
Accounting for multiple inputs in the production of children’s human capital, this paper emphasizes
two overarching aspects of the child development process. First, we study the degree to which parents’ time
with their child can be replaced by educational goods/services in the home and the degree to which these
family-based investments can be substituted for with market-based child care services. Second, we consider
how parental human capital influences the child production process through (i) the productivity of parental
time investments, (ii) the productivity of home goods/services investments, and (iii) factor-neutral child
productivity. Our approach explicitly recognizes that parental skills are more likely to directly impact the
productivity of family-based investments than market-based child care services. This distinction is novel,
yet conceptually important for understanding the types of investments made by different families.3
In considering the role of parental human capital in the child development process, it is important to
distinguish between a parent’s productivity in child investment and in the labor market. While these are
both related to a parent’s general human capital, they are not necessarily the same. A parent’s skills may
be more or less productive or may exhibit different degrees of diminishing returns in child-rearing relative
to the labor market. Even conditional on parental skill levels, there may be many idiosyncratic factors
that create a wedge between the value of skill at home and wage rates, including local labor market
variation in wages or marginal tax rates, various forms of idiosyncratic wage shocks (e.g., worker-firm
match quality), or wage growth due to long-term contracts or occupation- and firm-specific human capital
accumulation. For a working parent, the opportunity cost of investing time in child production depends
on all of the factors affecting his or her wage, including general human capital, while only the latter affects
the productivity of child investments. This rich heterogeneity in time costs across families affects both
labor market and child investment decisions and is important for understanding why policies may have
quite heterogeneous effects.
2Gayle, Golan, and Soytas (2014) estimate the importance of parental time inputs and required costs of child-rearing in a
model with fertility, marriage, and divorce. Molnar (2020) estimates the elasticity between parental time and a Cobb-Douglas
composite of home goods expenditures and market child care. Fiorini and Keane (2014) estimate the impacts of many different
categories of children’s time use on their cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes, concluding that educational activities with
parents are most productive. Todd and Wolpin (2007) estimate the effects of both home inputs (i.e., an index of home
environment quality) and school quality (e.g., local pupil-teacher ratios and teacher salaries) using value-added models of
cognitive achievement. They conclude that differences in school quality account for a very small proportion of race/ethnicity
gaps in achievement.
3Chaparro, Sojourner, and Wiswall (2020) consider a framework in which the productivity of parental time depends on
parental skills and an endogenous (costly) effort choice; however, they abstract from other home goods/services inputs.
3
We begin our analysis by documenting cross-sectional patterns in investment using the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its Child Development Supplement (CDS), which provides the most
comprehensive set of measures for the inputs we wish to study. We supplement this analysis using data
from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) and the Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX), both
of which suffer from a lack of joint measurements of all relevant inputs. We find that among working
parents, total expenditures on child investments are strongly increasing in maternal education. Yet, the
share of expenditures devoted to different inputs, including parental time, varies much less with parental
education.
We next develop a dynamic theoretical framework in order to better understand these cross-sectional
patterns and to explore the counterfactual impacts of policies that shape incentives to work and purchase
child care. This model allows for multiple child investment inputs within periods and multiple periods of
investment. Accordingly, we emphasize how the empirical content of this rich, multi-period model can be
decomposed into intratemporal and intertemporal components.
In the intratemporal problem, families choose child input allocations (parental time, household invest-
ment goods/services, and market-based child care services) to minimize expenditures given a per-period
level of total human capital investment. The optimal input allocation depends only on the technology
for per-period human capital accumulation, relative input prices, and full family income. Importantly, it
does not depend on the dynamics of skill production, credit markets, or preferences. We allow for varying
degrees of substitutability across inputs and incorporate potential effects of parental human capital on
the productivity of family-based time and goods/services investments. From this intratemporal problem,
we characterize expenditure shares as a function of relative prices and parental human capital. In the
intertemporal problem, families maximize lifetime utility by choosing consumption, savings, leisure, and
per-period total/composite human capital investment, given the composite price of investment (from the
intratemporal problem) and potentially binding borrowing constraints. From this problem, we character-
ize the dynamics of total investment expenditure as a function of the composite price of investment and
family income. Drawing on results from both the intratemporal and intertemporal problems enables us
to characterize the effects of input prices and parental human capital on each input over the lifecycle.
Our analysis demonstrates the critical role that substitutability across different inputs plays in the
investment responses of families to changes in input prices, including parental wages. When inputs are
sufficiently substitutable, families will substitute away from inputs whose price rises towards other inputs.
This is not necessarily the case when inputs are complementary. A particularly interesting case concerns
the effects of wage changes, which not only affect the opportunity cost of time investment but also impact
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family income. We show that the positive income effects from higher wages create incentives to increase
overall investments in children. If all investment inputs are sufficiently complementary, families may choose
to increase all types of investments, including time investments, despite the increase in their opportunity
costs. Thus, higher wages can cause parents to substitute leisure for time at work with minor, or even
positive, effects on time spent with children. Indeed, Bastian and Lochner (2020) estimate that wage
subsidies implicit in expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) led single mothers to reduce
their leisure time and home production but not their time spent investing in children.
Our analysis also highlights the many forces at work when comparing investments across parents with
different levels of human capital. Parental human capital not only affects the price of time investment
and family income levels, but may also impact the productivity of investment inputs. We focus on the
extent to which parental human capital raises the productivity of parents’ time inputs and household
goods/services inputs relative to the productivity of purchased child care. We show how these forces,
along with the substitutability of different inputs, determine the relationship between parental human
capital and investments in children. Most notably, we derive a useful “neutrality” result, which states that
investment expenditure shares are independent of parental skills when (i) those skills raise the productivity
of parental time with children and in the labor market at the same rate and (ii) parental skills have no
effect on the productivity of other inputs.
Our theoretical analysis emphasizes two key sets of parameters that are critical to characterizing
family investments in children: elasticities of substitution across inputs and the impacts of parental
human capital on the productivity of family investment inputs. We develop two complementary strategies
for estimating these parameters. First, we exploit intratemporal optimality alone to derive a series of
relative demand relationships that can be estimated using the PSID-CDS data. We leverage the flexibility
and simplicity of these estimating equations to explore the sensitivity of results to measures of parental
human capital, inclusion of other covariates, endogeneity of input choices, and measurement error in wages.
Second, we combine the intratemporal moment conditions with the intertemporal restrictions implied by
different assumptions on credit markets to estimate all parameters of the production technology (including
parameters related to the dynamics of skill accumulation), using a generalized method of moments (GMM)
procedure that accounts for the fact that our data provide only noisy measures of skills collected several
years apart. Our choice of specification and estimation strategy in this section is informed by the results
in the previous stage of analysis.
In order to estimate the production technology, we augment our PSID-CDS data by compiling a novel
dataset of child care prices using annual reports on the cost of child care in the U.S. from Child Care
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Aware of America (2009–2019). These data provide state by year variation in child care prices, which we
link with households in the PSID. Using this variation in prices (as well as variation in parental wages),
we find robust evidence across empirical strategies that parental time and purchased goods/services are
complements inside the home, while home investments are also complementary with child care inputs.
In both cases, elasticities of substitution range from around 0.2 to 0.5. This suggests that the relatively
constant expenditure shares across education categories that we document are not the consequence of a
Cobb-Douglas technology, but rather that competing forces driving the effect of human capital on relative
demand are in rough balance. In turn, the well-known parental education gradient in time spent with
children (e.g., Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney, 2008) is driven by overall demand for child investment inputs,
and not by factor augmentation of home inputs by parental human capital.
Finally, we explore some of the positive and normative implications of our estimates using counterfac-
tual simulations. We begin by documenting considerable variation in the composite price of investment,
driven largely by differences in parental wages. Roughly half of the variance in investment expenditures
across families can be explained by differences in the prices paid for inputs. Differences in input prices
(especially wages) are also responsible for some of the investment gaps by parental education. We next
study the implications of tax and subsidy policies by simulating the effects of price reductions for each
investment input. The moderate complementarity we estimate implies that all investment inputs move
together in response to any input price change. As noted earlier, we find that a decline in parental wages
leads to reductions in all types of investment, including small reductions in parental time investments,
due to the decline in resources. The resulting declines in achievement growth are broadly consistent with
previous evidence on the impacts of the EITC on child achievement (Dahl and Lochner, 2012; Agostinelli
and Sorrenti, 2018). Reductions in the price of home goods/services inputs or child care services cause
families to expand all types of investment, with much stronger own-price elasticities than cross-price elas-
ticities. Given the complementarity of investments, we find that the welfare distortions of price changes
on relative input allocations are quite modest; however, the full welfare distortions from wage changes are
sizeable when also accounting for impacts on total investment levels, leisure, and consumption. To gauge
the importance of estimating flexible patterns of substitution across inputs, we compare the policy re-
sponses based on our estimated nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) within-period production
function with the commonly assumed Cobb-Douglas specification (calibrated to match the same input
expenditure shares). While the Cobb-Douglas case produces similar conclusions regarding responses in
total investment (and achievement growth) to small input price changes, it performs much more poorly
when it comes to measuring the responses to larger price changes or in quantifying responses of different
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inputs to changes in relative prices.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section documents investment expenditure patterns by
maternal education for single mothers and two-parent households using data from the PSID-CDS, ATUS,
and CEX. Section 3 develops our theoretical framework for studying investment behavior and characterizes
the effects of parental human capital and input prices on three types of investment inputs: parental time,
home goods/services inputs, and market child care services. In Sections 4 and 5, we describe our approach
for estimating the technology of skill formation followed by the data used in estimation. Section 6 reports
our estimation results, while Section 7 presents our counterfactual analysis based on those estimates.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Basic Investment Patterns by Parental Education and Marital Status
This section gives an overview of child investment expenditures by parental education for single mothers
and two-parent households. This not only provides a preview of the PSID-CDS data we use in estimating
child production functions, but also highlights several interesting patterns our framework is designed to
better understand. Finally, due to the inherent difficulties of defining inputs like parental “investment
time” or household “investment goods and services” and likely measurement error in these measures as
well as expenditures on child care services, we also examine time investments in ATUS and household
goods/services and child care expenditures in the CEX.
2.1 Investments in the PSID
We begin with some basic patterns in the PSID-CDS. As with our estimation sample below, this
analysis focuses on families with only 1 or 2 children ages 12 or younger, parents ages 18–65, and mothers
who were ages 16–45 when their youngest child was born. An advantage of the PSID is that it enables
us to examine child-specific expenditures. Because the PSID only collected information on a broad set
of household goods/services investments in the 2002 CDS, this analysis is limited to that year (with
expenditures reported in year 2002 dollars) when nearly all of the children we study were ages 5–12. We
will often refer to these as home (or household) “goods” investments; however, they not only include
expenditures on school supplies, books, and toys, but also include expenditures on services like tutoring,
lessons, community groups, and sports activities. Consistent with previous studies using the PSID-CDS
(e.g., Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall, 2014; Mullins, 2019), our measure of parental time investments reflects
time actively engaging with children as recorded on time diaries. See Section 5 for greater detail on these
data.
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Table 1 reports weekly expenditure amounts on parental time, household goods, and child care invest-
ments by household type and maternal education. In calculating the expenditures for parental time, we
multiply active time with children by the parent’s reported wage rate.4 The amounts spent on children
are sizeable, with single mothers spending, on average, about $250 per week on child investment and
two-parent households spending more than double that amount, $608. Time expenditure amounts are
similar for both married and single mothers; however, children from two-parent families also benefit from
father’s time expenditures, which are of roughly similar magnitude. Household goods input expenditures
are about twice as high in two-parent homes, while child care expenditures are similar across family types.
When looking across education categories, we observe that expenditures are increasing substantially with
maternal education, with expenditures on each type of input roughly 2–3 times higher for children with
mothers who are college graduates vs. high school dropouts.
Table 2 calculates average expenditure shares on each type of investment input. Two features are
striking and could be anticipated by the expenditure amounts of the previous table. First, expenditures are
dominated by time investments, with single mothers (both parents in two-parent households) contributing
about 80% (90%) of their investment expenditures in the form of time. We see below that time investments
still dominate (though not as much) even when using a much narrower measure of time investment from
the ATUS. Second, the similarity of expenditure shares across maternal education levels is noteworthy.
While expenditures increase dramatically with parental education, all types of investments increase at
roughly similar rates. That said, we observe a modest increase in the expenditure share of single mother’s
time investment (beyond high school), coupled with a decline in household goods inputs. Expenditures
on child care services represent a very small share of overall investment expenditures, which varies little
with parental education or marital status.5
Because wages increase sharply with parental education, it is also interesting to look more directly
at parental time spent with children. Table 3 reports average hours of active time spent with children
each week in the 2002 PSID-CDS. Single and married mothers spend similar amounts of time investing
in their children, with fathers spending about one-third less time than their spouses. Not surprisingly,
differences in time spent with children by education are more muted than differences in the value of that
time. Differences in the time married parents spend with their children (by mother’s education) are quite
4We exclude non-working parents. We also trim the top/bottom 1% of reported wages to eliminate outliers.
5As discussed below, expenditures on child care services likely under-represent the full value of actual child care services
received, because many families benefit from free care provided by grandparents and older siblings (Laughlin, 2013). Con-
ditioning the sample on families with positive reported child care expenditures raises this share to 0.16 among all single
mothers and 0.10 among all two-parent households. Among single mothers with positive child care spending, there is a more
pronounced decline (increase) in the share of expenditures on child care services (maternal time) with education beyond
high school. This is not the case for two-parent households, where expenditure shares change little with maternal education
beyond high school. See Appendix Table D-1.
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small, while single mothers with a college degree spend up to 25% more time with their children than
their less-educated counterparts.
2.2 Investments in the ATUS and CEX
We turn now to the ATUS for an alternative set of parental time investment measures and the CEX for
measures of household goods and child care expenditures. For comparability, we use the same sampling
approach (notably, families with only 1 or 2 children, both ages 12 or less) as with the PSID; however,
this analysis differs in several respects. First, these data are based on surveys from 2003–18, although we
denominate expenditures in year 2002 dollars to match PSID amounts. Second, both ATUS and CEX
only report total household (not child-specific) investments. About half of the families in our samples
have one child, while the rest have two. Third, the PSID-CDS reference period for investment differs
from those of ATUS and CEX. The PSID collects time diaries on one weekday and one weekend day
for each child, recording all of their activities on those days, while ATUS records activities from a single
household member (a parent, in our case) using a time diary from one day. The PSID asks respondents
to report annual expenditures on the household investment measures we consider, while our primary
measure of market child care spending comes from questions about the costs associated with current
arrangements for the child. The CEX surveys respondents about expenditures at the quarterly level
for four quarters. (In all cases, we adjust to weekly amounts.) Fourth, we do not observe all types of
investment expenditures from any household in ATUS or CEX, so we cannot calculate expenditure shares
at the household level. Finally, compared to the PSID, we consider a narrower set of time investment
categories from ATUS and a slightly broader measure of household goods investment categories in the
CEX. Regarding time investments in ATUS, we make an effort to include only parental time with children
that is likely to directly reflect investments (e.g., reading to/with children, playing, helping with homework,
talking with/listening to children, providing and obtaining medical care, attending museums or movies).
Regarding household expenditures, in addition to expenses included in the PSID, the CEX also includes
expenditures on computers and software, as well as admission fees and tickets for entertainment activities
like movies, theater, concerts. See Appendix B for greater detail on the ATUS and CEX data.
Table 4 shows expenditure amounts on each type of investment from ATUS and the CEX. The most
notable differences between these figures and those of Table 1 (based on the PSID) are the substantially
lower estimated expenditures on parental time investment. Average time expenditures in ATUS are about
one-half to one-third their counterparts in the PSID due to the narrower definition of investment.6 Aver-
age expenditures on household goods investments are quite similar across the PSID and CEX; however,
6See Appendix Table D-2 for average investment time by marital status and mother’s education in ATUS.
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expenditures on child care services are 2–3 times higher in the CEX. Some of this gap is due to the fact that
the CEX is measuring expenditures for families with 1.5 children, on average, rather than the child-specific
amounts of the PSID. (This likely produces less of a discrepancy for time investments, because parents
often spend time with more than one child at a time.) Altogether, combining expenditures for ATUS and
CEX, we observe a lower share of total average expenditures coming from parental time (roughly 70% for
single mothers and 80% for married couples) and a higher share from child care (roughly 20% for single
mothers and 10% for married couples) relative to the PSID. Yet, even the narrow measure of parental
time investment taken from ATUS suggests that it is the dominant form of investment expenditure for
children ages 12 and under. More importantly for our analysis, the expenditure patterns by maternal
education in the CEX and ATUS are quite similar to those of the PSID: total average expenditures in-
crease substantially with mother’s education, while the shares devoted to each form of investment are
fairly stable.
3 Model
We develop an economic framework for understanding the investment and expenditure patterns of
Section 2 and the impacts of policies that distort the prices of investment inputs. This analysis highlights
the role of complementarity/substitutability of different inputs and the extent to which parental human
capital raises the productivity of parental time and purchased home inputs.
Consider two-parent households that are made up of a mother, a father, and a child. These households
may be ex ante heterogenous over the learning ability of the child, θ, initial human capital of the child, Ψ1,
and human capital of the mother and father, Hm and Hf , respectively.
7 (Single-mother households are
identical but without any “father” time, wages, etc.) In every period t = 1, ..., T , the household chooses
consumption, ct, mother’s and father’s leisure, lm,t and lf,t, respectively, and investments in children.
Child investments take place in the home or in the market. Home investments include time of the
mother, τm,t, time of the father, τf,t, and goods, gt. Market-based child care services are represented by
Yc,t.
8 Child skills evolve according to
Ψt+1 = Ht (ft (τm,t, τf,t, gt, Yc,t;Hm, Hf ) , θ,Ψt) , (1)
7Because we abstract from schooling inputs, heterogeneity in θ would also reflect differences in school quality. We implicitly
assume that school quality is equally substitutable with all of the inputs we consider.
8Without data on the quality of child care chosen by or available for families, we have chosen not to explicitly model a
quantity-quality tradeoff for child care services, implicitly assuming that families purchase the optimal mix given available
options. If care is priced according to its productivity in a competitive market, then families would generally be indifferent
to the mix. In this case, our reference to a price of child care, Pc,t, can be thought of as the price for a fixed quality of care
and unit of time.
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where ft (τm,t, τf,t, gt, Yc,t;Hm, Hf ) is a homogenous of degree 1 function that represents the total human
capital investment a child receives within a period as a function of all inputs that period.
Normalizing the time endowment to 1 for each parent, parental hours working are hm,t = 1− lm,t−τm,t
and hf,t = 1− lf,t−τf,t. A parent’s period t wage is given by Wj,t = wj,tHj , j = m, f, where we distinguish
between the part of wages related to skills used in child production (Hj) and an unrelated component
(wj,t). For expositional purposes, we assume the component related to child development is fixed over
time (e.g., upon a parent finishing school or the child’s birth), while the time-varying part, which we
often refer to as the price of skill, incorporates wage differences across parents due to factors like labor
market experience, discrimination in the labor market, or local wage variation.9 Let yt reflect income
other than labor earnings (e.g., transfers) in period t. The price of home investment goods is given by
pt, and the price of market child care is given by Pc,t. Let Πt ≡ (Wm,t,Wf,t, pt, Pc,t) reflect the vector of
all investment input prices faced by the household at time t. Assets at the start of period t are denoted
by At, and households can borrow and save at interest rate r, subject to borrowing constraints requiring
At+1 ≥ At,min.
Households have per period preferences over consumption (with price normalized to one) and leisure
given by u(ct) + vm(lm,t) + vf (lf,t) and discount across periods at the rate β > 0. In period T + 1,
households have a continuation value, Ũ(Hm, Hf , AT+1), that depends on parental human capital and
assets. Households also care about the final human capital of children, Ṽ (ΨT+1). The household’s problem
for periods t = 1, ..., T, is given by
Vt(θ,Hm, Hf , At, yt,Πt,Ψt)
= max
lm,t,τm,t,lf,t,τf,t,gt,Yc,t,At+1
u(ct) + vm(lm,t) + vf (lf,t) + βVt+1(θ,Hm, Hf , At+1, yt+1,Πt+1,Ψt+1)
subject to non-negative inputs (τm,t, τf,t, gt, Yc,t), lj,t ≥ 0 and lj,t + τj,t ≤ 1 for j = m, f , child human
capital production equation (1),
ct + ptgt +Wm,tτm,t +Wf,tτf,t + Pc,tYc,t +At+1 = (1 + r)At + yt +Wm,t(1− lm,t) +Wf,t(1− lf,t),
At+1 ≥ Amin,t,
VT+1(θ,Hm, Hf , AT+1, yT+1,ΠT+1,ΨT+1) = Ũ(Hm, Hf , AT+1) + Ṽ (ΨT+1).
We assume u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0, v′j(·) > 0, and v′′j (·) ≤ 0, j = m, f. We also assume standard Inada
conditions for preferences over consumption and leisure.
9Our empirical analysis will explicitly incorporate some time-varying factors, like number of children or child’s age, into
the production of child skills.
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The first-order conditions for this problem are reported in Appendix A. During periods in which parents
work (i.e., hj,t > 0), it is straightforward and instructive to separate the problem into two distinct parts: (i)
an intratemporal problem choosing child input allocations to minimize expenditures given child’s per period
total human capital investment Xt = ft (τm,t, τf,t, gt, Yc,t;Hm, Hf ), and (ii) an intertemporal problem
of maximizing lifetime utility by choosing savings At+1 (or consumption ct), leisure lm,t and lf,t, and
child’s per period total human capital investment Xt. This approach highlights that assumptions about
dynamics (e.g., credit markets, structure of Ht(·)) and the precise nature of preferences (overconsumption,
leisure, and child skill levels) are unimportant for the within-period allocation of child investment inputs.10
Furthermore, when considering allocations over time, multiple investment inputs within a period can be
collapsed into a composite per period total investment with an associated composite per period price that
depends on all input prices and parameters of the within-period investment function ft (·). Embedding
complexity within a period does not complicate the dynamics of the model, and the dynamics do not
complicate the within-period input allocation problem. Throughout the rest of this section, we consider
the intratemporal and intertemporal problems assuming that parents are working, so the price of parents’
time is reflected in their wages.
3.1 Intratemporal Problem
Given a level of total human capital investment in a period, Xt, the intratemporal problem minimizes
its cost.11 Assuming parents work in the market, the cost of investing time with their children is measured
by their wages. The solution to this problem indicates how investment inputs depend on relative input
prices and parental human capital for any given level of total investment Xt. It also determines the unit
price of total investment Xt that is central to the dynamic decision problem. This unit price, p̄t, depends
only on the parameters of the within-period investment function ft(·) and input prices Πt.
The intratemporal problem is given by
min
gt,τm,t,τf,t,Yc,t
ptgt + Pc,tYc,t +Wm,tτm,t +Wf,tτf,t
subject to non-negative inputs (τm,t, τf,t, gt, Yc,t), τm,t ≤ 1, τf,t ≤ 1, and Xt = ft(τm,t, τf,t, gt, Yc,t;Hm, Hf ).
Throughout our analysis, we consider a nested CES within-period investment function:
ft =
[(
am,t(Hm)τ
ρt
m,t + af,t(Hf )τ
ρt
f,t + ag,t(Hm, Hf )g
ρt
t
)γt/ρt
+ aY ctY
γt
c,t
]1/γt
, ρt < 1, γt < 1. (2)
10As discussed in Appendix A, the price of time investment depends on the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and leisure for parents who do not work. In this case, the investment cost is in terms of consumption (expenditures) and
lost leisure and cannot be written as a single expenditure minimization problem. If borrowing constraints bind, then the full
problem can be trivially separated into a series of intratemporal problems.
11While we abstract from uncertainty about future prices and income to simplify the analysis of the intertemporal problem,
the intratemporal problem described here is unaffected by uncertainty.
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We highlight three aspects of this specification. First, it allows parental human capital to affect the
productivity of household time and goods investments through their respective share parameters. (We
generally leave the conditioning on parental human capital implicit, except where it plays an important
role.) Second, it accommodates flexible substitution patterns between parental time and goods within the
household and between these inputs and market-based child care services. The elasticity of substitution
between parental time and household goods inputs is constant and given by ετ,g,t ≡ 1/(1 − ρt). By
contrast, the elasticity of substitution between market child care services and household goods or parental
time investments varies with input levels; however, the elasticity between market child care Yc,t and
“home composite investment” XH,t ≡
(
am,tτ
ρt
m,t + af,tτ
ρt
f,t + ag,tg
ρt
t
)1/ρt
is given by εY,H,t ≡ 1/(1 − γt).
We will generally refer to two inputs as substitutable if their elasticity of substitution is greater than
one (e.g., ετ,g,t > 1 and ρt > 0) and complementary if their elasticity is less than one. The commonly
employed Cobb-Douglas case assumes an elasticity of one across all inputs. Lastly, our specification for
ft(·) is homogenous of degree 1, which is essential for separating the full problem into intratemporal and
intertemporal problems. See Appendix A.
Ratios of first-order conditions for this expenditure minimization problem clarify the dependence of
investment ratios on their relative prices, technology share parameters, elasticities of substitution between
different inputs, and parental human capital:
W̃j,t ≡
Wj,t
pt
=
aj,tτ
ρt−1
jt
ag,tg
ρt−1
t
, j = m, f, (3)
P̃c,t ≡
Pc,t
pt
=
aY c,tY
γt−1
c,t
(am,tτ
ρt
m,t + af,tτ
ρt
f,t + ag,tg
ρt
t )
(γt−ρt)/ρtag,tg
ρt−1
t
. (4)
From these expressions, we can see that parental time and market child care investments are proportional
to household goods inputs: τj,t = Φj,tgt, for j = m, f, and Yc,t = Φc,tgt, where the factors of proportionality
depend on relative prices and production technology parameters:
Φj,t =
[
ag,t
aj,t
W̃j,t
] 1
ρt−1
, j = m, f, (5)
Φc,t =
(
ag,t
aY c,t
) 1
γt−1
(
am,tΦ
ρt
m,t + af,tΦ
ρt
f,t + ag,t
) γt−ρt
ρt(γt−1) P̃
1
γt−1
c,t . (6)
These constants appear repeatedly throughout our analysis, including the econometric specifications below.
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3.1.1 Unit Prices for Total/Composite Investment
Using Equations (5) and (6), it is straightforward to show that total investment Xt is proportional to
each input. For example, we have the following relationship between Xt and household goods inputs:
Xt = gt
[(
am,tΦ
ρt
m,t + af,tΦ
ρt
f,t + ag,t
) γt
ρt + aY c,tΦ
γt
c,t
] 1
γt
, (7)
while total expenditures on investments in children are given by
Et ≡ p̄t(Πt;Hm, Hf )Xt = ptgt + Pc,tYc,t +Wm,tτm,t +Wf,tτf,t. (8)
Equations (7) and (8) together imply that the unit price of period t investment is
p̄t(Πt;Hm, Hf ) =
pt + Pc,tΦc,t +Wm,tΦm,t +Wf,tΦf,t[(
am,tΦ
ρt
mt + af,tΦ
ρt
f,t + ag,t
) γt
ρt + aY c,tΦ
γt
c,t
] 1
γt
, (9)
where Φj,t for j ∈ {m, f} and Φc,t depend on input prices and parental human capital as defined in
Equations (5) and (6), respectively. The evolution of this unit price is central to the dynamics of investment
as described in the intertemporal problem of Section 3.2.
3.1.2 Expenditure Shares
The analysis of the previous subsection makes clear that input choices, given any level of total in-
vestment expenditure, can be determined from the intratemporal problem alone. Based on this, we next
characterize how the allocation of resources to each input depends on input prices and parental human
capital. Focusing on expenditure shares, this analysis depends only on the within-period production
function ft(·).
For simplicity, we consider the case of single mothers and drop all time subscripts (as we focus on
within-period relationships), so
f =
[
(amτ
ρ
m + agg
ρ)γ/ρ + aY cY
γ
c
]1/γ
. (10)
Total investment expenditures are E = pg + PcYc + Wmτm = g (p+ PcΦc +WmΦm), where the latter
follows from Equations (5) and (6). We can write expenditure shares as
Sg ≡
pg
E
=
p
p+ PcΦc +WmΦm
, Sτm ≡
Wmτm
E
=
WmΦm
p+ PcΦc +WmΦm
, SY c ≡
PcYc
E
=
PcΦc
p+ PcΦc +WmΦm
,
which are independent of total investment, X. This property is useful, because we can consider the effects
of input prices or parental skills on input shares without concern for the level of total investment.
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As is well-known, if ρ = γ = 0, the within-period production function f(·) is Cobb-Douglas, and
expenditure shares are independent of input prices. More generally, impacts of price changes depend
on the substitutability of inputs. Families facing a price increase for one input will tend to substitute
away from that input and towards others that are sufficiently substitutable. By contrast, when inputs
are sufficiently complementary, they will tend to co-move in response to any price change. The following
results formally characterize these implications for expenditure shares.
Proposition 1. If and only if γ < 0, then Pc has strictly positive own-price effects on SYc and strictly
negative cross-price effects on Sg and Sτm.
Complementarity between market child care services and the home composite input (γ < 0) means
that households do not substitute enough from external child care to household inputs in response to an
increase in child care prices, so their share of investment expenditures on child care services increases,
while expenditure shares on both household inputs (time and goods) decrease. With substitutability
between home inputs and market child care (γ > 0), an increase in Pc causes households to substitute out
of child care enough to offset the price increase, resulting in a lower share of expenditures on child care
and higher shares for both household inputs.
Given the nested nature of f(·), the impacts of price changes on home inputs g and τm are slightly
more complicated, though symmetric.
Proposition 2. Expenditure shares on home inputs (g or τm) are strictly decreasing in their own price (p
or wm) if min{ρ, γ} > 0 and strictly increasing in their own price if max{ρ, γ} < 0. Expenditure shares on
home inputs are strictly decreasing in the other home input price if ρ < min{0, γ}, and strictly increasing
in the other home input price if ρ > max{0, γ}. The expenditure share on market child care services is
strictly increasing in the price of both home inputs if and only if γ > 0.
Complementarity between both home inputs (ρ < 0) and between the home composite input and
market child care (γ < 0) ensures that substitution out of a home input whose price rises is insufficient
to compensate for the higher price, leading to a greater expenditure share on that input. If home inputs
are not only complementary (ρ < 0) but also more complementary than home inputs with market child
care (ρ < γ), then an increase in the price of one home input will cause the expenditure share of the other
to fall. The converse of these statements applies when inputs are substitutes. Finally, substitutability
between home and market inputs (γ > 0) implies that an increase in either home input will raise the share
of expenditures on child care, while complementarity (γ < 0) implies the opposite.
Changes in parental human capital have still more complicated effects on expenditure shares, because
they not only affect the price of parental time through wages, but they may also directly affect the
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production of child skills. Letting am(Hm) = ām[ϕm(Hm)]
ρ and ag(Hm) = āg[ϕg(Hm)]
ρ, with constants
ām > 0 and āg > 0, we assume the following convenient functional forms:
ϕm(Hm) = H
ϕ̄m
m with ϕ̄m ≥ 0, (11)
ϕg(Hm) = H
ϕ̄g
m with ϕ̄g ≥ 0. (12)
The exponents ϕ̄m and ϕ̄g determine the returns to scale of parental human capital in the production of
child skills. To isolate the role of productivity in mother’s time investment for the relationship between
expenditure shares and maternal human capital, we begin by considering the case of ϕ̄g = 0. We then
discuss the implications of allowing maternal human capital to affect the productivity of home goods
investments (i.e., ϕ̄g > 0) as well.
When ϕ̄g = 0, inspection of the factors of proportionality Φm and Φc (see Equations (5) and (6))
makes clear that ∂Φm∂Hm = (1− ϕ̄m)
(
wm
Hm
)
∂Φm
∂wm
and ∂Φc∂Hm = (1− ϕ̄m)
(
wm
Hm
)
∂Φc
∂wm
. This implies that
∂Sj
∂Hm
= (1− ϕ̄m)
(
wm
Hm
)
∂Sj
∂wm
, for j = g, τm, Yc. (13)
When ϕ̄m = 1, so ϕm(Hm) exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS), parental human capital has no effect
on investment expenditure shares, regardless of the substitutability of different inputs in skill production
(i.e., ρ and γ). In this case, a mother’s skills improve her labor market earnings and child productivity at
the same rate, leaving her incentives to invest time in her child unaffected. This “neutrality” result is of
particular interest, because it offers one potential explanation for the modest differences in expenditure
shares by maternal education (despite substantial differences in investment expenditure levels) reported
in Section 2.
When ϕm(Hm) exhibits decreasing returns to scale (i.e., ϕ̄m < 1), the effects of mother’s human
capital on expenditure shares mirror the effects of changes in wm as described in Proposition 2. She is
relatively more productive working in the market and moves away from home time investments if inputs
are substitutable.12 By contrast, when ϕm(Hm) exhibits increasing returns to scale (i.e., ϕ̄m > 1), mothers
are relatively more productive in child development than in the labor market. In this case, an increase
in maternal skills raises her marginal benefit of investing relative to her marginal cost, which produces
similar effects to a fall in the price of her time.
Now, consider ϕ̄g > 0, so the productivity of home goods investment is increasing in maternal human
capital. This introduces two opposing forces. On one hand, goods inputs are more productive, creating an
incentive for more skilled mothers to purchase more of them. On the other hand, maternal human capital
12In the special case of ϕ̄m = 0, maternal skills do not enter the child production technology, and changes in maternal skills
play the same role as changes in wm, with both simply raising the marginal cost of investment.
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is factor-augmenting so a more skilled mother can buy less goods inputs and still get more “effective” goods
investment (H
ϕ̄g
m g), freeing up resources to be invested in terms of her time and market child care. If
inputs are very substitutable, the first force dominates and it is beneficial to load investment into the more
productive home goods as maternal human capital rises. By contrast, if inputs are very complementary,
then the second force is stronger, and more educated mothers take advantage of the increased productivity
of home goods input by shifting resources to other inputs. The more her productivity depends on her
human capital, the stronger these two forces become. The overall implications of ϕ̄g > 0 on expenditure
shares is most transparent when the effect of maternal skills on the productivity of time investment is
neutralized by assuming ϕ̄m = 1. The following proposition formally characterizes this case. (Appendix A
characterizes the relationship between maternal human capital and expenditure shares more generally.)
Proposition 3. Suppose ϕ̄m = 1 and ϕ̄g > 0. (A) Sτ is strictly decreasing in Hm if ρ > max{0, γ}, while
it is strictly increasing in Hm if ρ < min{0, γ}. (B) Sg is strictly decreasing in Hm if max{ρ, γ} < 0,
while it is strictly increasing in Hm if min{ρ, γ} > 0. (C) SYc is strictly decreasing in Hm if and only if
γ > 0.
While the intratemporal problem is sufficient to characterize expenditure shares, we next consider the
intertemporal problem to study investment levels and how they respond to changes in input prices or
parental skills.
3.2 Intertemporal Problem
Suppose in every period, t = 1, ..., T, along with leisure and assets, the household chooses an amount
of total child investment Xt, given a per period composite price p̄t (determined by the intratemporal
problem). This problem can be written as follows:
Vt(θ,Hm, Hf , At, yt,Πt,Ψt) = max
lm,t,lf,t,Xt,At+1
u(ct)+v(lm,t)+v(lf,t)+β [Vt+1(θ,Hm, Hf , At+1, yt+1,Πt+1,Ψt+1)]
subject to 0 ≤ lm,t, lf,t ≤ 1, Xt ≥ 0,
ct + p̄t(Πt, Hm, Hf )Xt +At+1 = (1 + r)At + yt +Wm,t(1− lm,t) +Wf,t(1− lf,t),
Ψt+1 = Ht (Xt, θ,Ψt) ,
At+1 ≥ Amin,t, (14)
VT+1(θ,Hm, Hf , AT+1, yT+1,ΠT+1,ΨT+1) = Ũ(Hm, Hf , AT+1) + Ṽ (ΨT+1).
The first-order conditions for parental leisure are
v′(lj,t) = u
′(ct)Wj,t, j = m, f, (15)
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while the standard Euler equation for consumption may be distorted by borrowing constraints:
u′(ct) ≥ β(1 + r)u′(ct+1) with strict inequality if and only if Equation (14) binds.
As discussed in the literature (e.g., Becker and Tomes, 1986; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Caucutt and
Lochner, 2020), the presence of binding borrowing constraints can distort intertemporal consumption and
child investment decisions.
Throughout the rest of this paper, we borrow two assumptions from Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall
(2014) that facilitate an analytical characterization of investment behavior.
Assumption 1. Ṽ (ΨT+1) = α ln(ΨT+1).
Assumption 2. Ψt+1 = θX
δ1
t Ψ
δ2
t .
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Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the first-order condition for Xt is quite simple and can be written as:
p̄tu
′(ct) =
αβT−t+1δT−t2 δ1
Xt
, (16)
which has several useful properties. First, it implies that Xt depends only on past decisions (including past
investments), current skills, and borrowing constraints through the marginal utility of consumption u′(ct).
Second, Xt (and its dynamics) depends only on input prices through the unit price p̄t (as determined by
Equation (9) from the intratemporal problem). Third, if we define the constant Kt ≡ αβT−t+1δT−t2 δ1,
Equation (16) can be rearranged to obtain a simple expression for total investment expenditures:
Et = Kt/u
′(ct), (17)
which is a function of the marginal utility of consumption and parameters related to preferences and child
skill production. This proves convenient for characterizing the effects of input prices and parental human
capital on investment expenditures.14
We make standard assumptions about preferences for consumption and leisure throughout the rest of
this section.
Assumption 3. u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ , σ > 0, and vj(l) = ψj
l1−ν
1−ν , ν > 0, for j = m, f .
13This technology is consistent with self-productivity (δ2 > 0) and dynamic complementarity of investments (Cunha and
Heckman, 2007).
14A fourth implication is that child learning ability θ does not affect investment behavior (or any other decisions). This de-
rives from Assumption 1 and multiplicative separability between θ and (Xt,Ψt) in skill production (Assumption 2). Together,
these imply that θ is additively separable from all other choice and state variables in discounted lifetime utility.
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With Assumptions 1–3, equations (15) and (17) can be written as
Wj,tlj,t = ψ
1/ν
j W
(ν−1)/ν
j,t c
σ/ν
t (18)
Et = Ktc
σ
t . (19)
While these conditions for leisure and investment behavior do not depend on the ability to smooth con-
sumption, the dynamics of investment choices depend on whether or not credit constraints bind. We begin
by examining the simpler case in which constraints bind, followed by the slightly more complicated case
of non-binding constraints.
3.2.1 Binding Borrowing Constraints
Suppose a family is borrowing constrained in period t with At+1 = Amin,t. The first-order conditions
for leisure and total investment continue to hold, and the budget constraint for this period is given by
ct = (1 + r)At +Wm,t(1− lm,t) +Wf,t(1− lf,t) + yt − Et −Amin,t. (20)
Substituting in for Wj,tlj,t and Et using Equations (18) and (19) yields
ct + ψ
1/ν
m c
σ/ν
t W
(ν−1)/ν
m,t + ψ
1/ν
f c
σ/ν
t W
(ν−1)/ν
f,t +Ktc
σ
t = (1 + r)At +Wm,t +Wf,t + yt −Amin,t.
From this, we apply the implicit function theorem to obtain the effects of input prices, non-labor income,
and parental human capital on consumption: ∂ct/∂pt = ∂ct/∂Pc,t = 0,
∂ct
∂wj,t
=
(
1− (1− 1ν )ψ
1/ν
j W
−1/ν
j,t c
σ/ν
t
)
Hj
1 +
(
ψ
1/ν
m W
−1/ν
m,t + ψ
1/ν
f W
−1/ν
f,t
) (
σ
ν
)
c
(σ−ν)/ν
t +Ktσc
σ−1
t
> 0, j ∈ {m, f},
∂ct
∂yt
=
1
1 +
(
ψ
1/ν
m W
−1/ν
m,t + ψ
1/ν
f W
−1/ν
f,t
) (
σ
ν
)
c
(σ−ν)/ν
t +Ktσc
σ−1
t
> 0,
and ∂ct∂Hj =
∂ct
∂wj,t
wj,t
Hj
> 0 for j ∈ {m, f}.15 Because ∂Et∂π = Ktσc
σ−1
t
∂ct
∂π for π ∈ {pt, Pc,t, yt, wm,t, wf,t, Hm, Hf},
we have the following result.
Proposition 4. Suppose borrowing constraints bind in period t. Then, total investment expenditures in
period t are strictly increasing in parental human capital, skill prices in period t, and non-labor income in
period t, with ∂Et∂Hj =
∂Et
∂wj,t
wj,t
Hj
> 0 for j ∈ {m, f}. Total investment expenditures are independent of all
future prices and non-labor income, as well as period t prices for household goods inputs and child care.
15Note that the first-order conditions for leisure imply lj,t = ψ
1/ν
j W
−1/ν
j,t c
σ/ν
t < 1, so
(
1− 1
ν
)
ψ
1/ν
j W
−1/ν
j,t c
σ/ν
t < 1.
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Only current income, current wages, and parental human capital affect total investment expenditures.
Notably, any increase in the unit price of investment p̄t caused by changes in the prices of home goods
inputs or child care is perfectly offset by adjustments in input quantities. (We further discuss the impacts
of input price changes on each of the inputs quantities below.)
Finally, if we follow Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2014) (and several subsequent papers) by assuming
log preferences for consumption and leisure (i.e., u(c) = ln(c) and vj(lj) = ψj ln(lj), ψj ≥ 0, for j ∈ {m, f}),
then we obtain a closed form expression for total investment:
Xt =
Kt [(1 + r)At +Wm,t +Wf,t + yt −Amin,t]
p̄t [1 + ψm + ψf +Kt]
. (21)
From this, we see that the dynamics of constrained investment depend on both the dynamics of input
prices through p̄t and the dynamics of “full” family income, Wm,t + Wf,t + yt. Furthermore, changes in
input prices or parental human capital only affect total investment expenditures, Et = p̄tXt, through their
effects on “full” income that period.
3.2.2 Non-binding Borrowing Constraints
If a family is not borrowing constrained in period t, then u′(ct) = β(1 + r)u
′(ct+1). Combining this
with the first-order conditions for Xt and Xt+1 implies the following dynamics for total child investment:
Xt =
[
p̄t+1δ2
p̄t(1 + r)
]
Xt+1. (22)
This condition does not depend on functional forms for period utility, u(·) or v(·), and highlights that in
the absence of credit frictions, the dynamics of total investment depend only on δ2 and relative composite
input prices p̄t — current income levels and the dynamics of income are irrelevant.
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We now consider the case of non-binding constraints throughout the remaining parents’ lifetime as
the polar opposite case to binding constraints above. In this case, lifetime family income matters. The
lifecycle budget constraint for unconstrained families (from t to T + 1) is given by17
T−t∑
j=0
(1 + r)−jct+j = (1 + r)At − (1 + r)−(T−t)AT+1
+
T−t∑
j=0
(1 + r)−j [Wm,t+j(1− lm,t+j) +Wf,t+j(1− lf,t+j) + yt+j − p̄t+jXt+j ] .
16As noted in Abbott (2020), uninsured wage risk for parents introduces an intertemporal investment wedge due to covari-
ation between the stochastic discount factor and future investment. We abstract from this uncertainty.
17Intermediate cases in which constraints are non-binding for a subperiod of parents’ remaining lives would be quite
similar, with the relevant budget constraint determining period t investment behavior covering period t through the period
when constraints first bind.
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To characterize investment expenditures when constraints are non-binding throughout parents’ lives,
we make a simplifying assumption on the continuation value function Ũ .
Assumption 4. Ũ(Hm, Hf , A) = Û(A+DmHm+DfHf ) where the constants Dm and Df are non-negative
and Û(·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Assumption 4 represents the case where parents at date T + 1 value their remaining lifetime wealth as
defined by current assets plus the discounted present value of all future earnings represented by DjHj .
18
It is useful to define ∆(x) ≡ Û ′(x), which is a strictly decreasing function given strict concavity of Û(·).
Assumptions 1–3 imply Equations (18) and (19), while Assumption 4 implies AT+1 = ∆
−1(β−1c−σT )−
DHm. We next make the convenient assumption that β(1 + r) = 1. This implies ct = c for all t, which
simplifies expressions that follow without altering any important conclusions. As with the approach in
the binding constraint case, we can now substitute these expressions into the lifecycle budget constraint
and collect consumption terms to obtain
ΥT−tc+
T−t∑
j=0
(1 + r)−j
[
ψ1/νm W
(ν−1)/ν
m,t+j + ψ
1/ν
f W
(ν−1)/ν
f,t+j
]
cσ/ν + K̄tc
σ + (1 + r)−(T−t)∆−1
(
β−1c−σ
)
= (1 + r)At +
T−t∑
j=0
(1 + r)−j [Wm,t+j +Wf,t+j + yt+j ] + (1 + r)
−(T−t) [DmHm +DfHf ] , (23)
where the constants ΥT−t ≡
T−t∑
j=0
(1 + r)−j > 0 and K̄t ≡
T−t∑
j=0
(1 + r)−jKt+j > 0. This implicitly defines
consumption as a function of current and future wages, non-labor income, parental human capital, period
t assets, and other preference/technology parameters. We then use the implicit function theorem to
determine how prices, non-labor income, and maternal human capital affect consumption. Because Et =
Ktc
σ (see Equation (19)), we then characterize total investment expenditures (see Appendix A for details).
Proposition 5. Suppose borrowing constraints are non-binding from year t to T . Total investment expen-
ditures, Et, are strictly increasing in current and future skill prices, current and future non-labor income,
and parental human capital. Et is independent of current and future prices for home goods inputs and
child care services.
As with the case when borrowing constraints bind, total investment expenditures are increasing in
current non-labor income, the current skill price and parental human capital, while they are independent
of home goods inputs and child care prices. Contrary to the constrained case, the ability to smooth income
18For example, Dj =
TR−(T+1)∑
k=0
(1 + r)−kwT+1+k, assuming individuals retire at date TR.
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across periods means that investment expenditures also depend on all future levels of non-labor income
and skill prices. Thus, a permanent increase in skill prices will have greater impacts on current investment
expenditures than a one-time increase in the price.
Finally, if we assume log preferences for consumption and leisure (i.e., u(c) = ln(c) and vj(lj) =
ψj ln(lj), ψj ≥ 0, for j ∈ {m, f}), as well as a log continuation utility (i.e., Ũ(Hm, Hf , A) = D0 ln(A +
DmHm + DfHf ), with D0, Dm, and Df all non-negative), then we obtain a closed form expression for
total investment much like Equation (21) of the borrowing constrained case:
Xt =
Kt
[
(1 + r)At +
T−t∑
j=0
(1 + r)−j (Wm,t+j +Wf,t+j + yt+j) + (1 + r)
−(T−t) (DmHm +DfHf )
]
p̄t
[
(1 + ψm + ψf )ΥT−t + (1 + r)−(T−t)βD0 + K̄t
] .
Compared to the constrained case, we see that total investment for unconstrained families depends on
the discounted present value of lifetime (rather than current) “full” income as well as the continuation
value of parental human capital. Also, note that the denominator reflects discounted lifetime sums of
(1+ψm+ψf ) and Kt rather than only their current values. As a result, a single period change in wages or
non-labor income in period t will have much smaller effects on investment in that period when constraints
are not binding compared to when they bind. This is not surprising, because any change in income is
spread across all periods (in terms of investment and consumption) when families are unconstrained.
3.3 Effects of Input Prices and Parental Human Capital on Investment Inputs
It is possible to fully characterize investment behavior analytically if Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and
preferences for consumption and leisure are given by u(c) = ln(c) and vj(lj) = ψj ln(lj), j ∈ {m, f},
and Ũ(Hm, Hf , A) = D0 ln(A + DmHm + DfHf ).
19 We make these assumptions here to facilitate an
analysis of the effects of input price changes on investment input allocations, as well as the relationship
between parental human capital and investments in children. To simplify the exposition, we characterize
investment behavior for single mothers, assuming the within-period production function of Equation (10).
As above, we consider families that are currently borrowing constrained or that are always uncon-
strained. Combining the intertemporal solution for Xt in Equation (21) with the intratemporal solutions
from Section 3.1 (Equations (7) and (9)), for a constrained family, we obtain
gt =
(
(1 + r)At + yt −Amin,t +Wm,t
pt + Pc,tΦc,t +Wm,tΦm,t
)(
Kt
1 + ψm +Kt
)
, (24)
19Unlike Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2014) and several subsequent studies, we do not rely on strong assumptions about
the within-period production function ft(·), nor do we limit ourselves to the case of no borrowing/saving.
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while we can similarly obtain the following for always unconstrained families:
gt =

(1 + r)At +
T−t∑
j=0
(1 + r)−j [Wm,t+j + yt+j ] + (1 + r)
t−TDmHm
pt + Pc,tΦc,t +Wm,tΦm,t

(
Kt
(1 + ψm)ΥT−t + (1 + r)−(T−t)βD0 + K̄t
)
.
(25)
From gt, we can recover maternal time investment τm,t = Φm,tgt and market child care investment Yc,t =
Φc,tgt, where Φm,t and Φc,t are given by Equations (5) and (6), respectively.
Because Φm,t and Φc,t are independent of non-labor income, it is clear that this income positively affects
all investment inputs. We are more interested in the extent to which input prices and parental education
affect different types of investments in children, much as we studied their impacts on input expenditure
shares in Section 3.1.2. The additional assumptions on preferences make it feasible to account for the
effects of price changes on the levels of investment in our fully dynamic framework. Note that current
prices enter the two expressions for gt, Equations (24) and (25), in the same manner. Mother’s skill level
and skill prices impact input levels via current and all future wages when a family is unconstrained, while
they only affect input levels through current wages when a family is constrained.
3.3.1 Input Price Effects on Investment Inputs
To emphasize the roles played by the intratemporal and intertemporal problems and to link to previous
results, it is useful to decompose the optimal quantity of an input into three parts: its expenditure share,
total expenditures, and its own price. Consider, for example, the identity for home goods inputs:
gt =
EtSg,t
pt
.
The expenditure share is determined in the intratemporal problem, with its response to changes in input
prices and maternal skills described in Section 3.1.2. The level of expenditure comes out of the intertem-
poral problem, and its dependence on input prices and maternal skills is characterized in Propositions 4
and 5. Lastly, for each input amount, there is a direct negative impact of its own-price change.
Total expenditures are invariant to the prices of home goods and market child care services (see
Propositions 4 and 5). As such, changes in these prices have exactly the same impact on home investment
time as they do on home investment time shares (in percentage terms). This is also the case for cross-price
effects of changes in p on Yc and changes in Pc on g. For the impacts of changes in p on g or Pc on Yc, we
also need to account for the negative effects of own-price changes. A key difference with our expenditure
share results is that the quantities of purchased home investment goods and market child services always
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fall with an own-price increase, while their shares increase if there is complementarity across inputs (see
Propositions 1 and 2).
Increases in skill prices and parental human capital not only affect expenditure shares, but also raise
total investment expenditures (see Propositions 4 and 5). Consequently, an increase in skill prices or
parental skills may increase home goods investments or child care services even if their expenditure shares
decline. Additionally, the value of parental time devoted to child investment increases more (in percentage
terms) than does its expenditure share; however, the amount of time parents spend with their children may
decline. The following proposition discusses the role of input substitutability in determining investment
input responses to changes in the skill price. Like the propositions that follow, it applies equally to the
case of borrowing constrained and always unconstrained families.20
Proposition 6. (A) If min{γ, ρ} > 0, then parental time investment is strictly decreasing in wm,t. (B)
If ρ > max{0, γ}, then home goods inputs are strictly increasing in wm,t. (C) If γ > 0, then market child
care is strictly increasing in wm,t.
Proposition 6 considers the case of a change in the current skill price, wm,t.
21 Recall that a rise in the
current skill price increases both family income and the price of time, where the former leads to greater
total investment expenditures (Propositions 4 and 5). Despite this increase, the higher price of time
leads to a reduction in parental time investment when all inputs are substitutes. If parental time and
goods investments are more substitutable than home inputs and market child care, then the reduction in
time investment is compensated for with an increase in home goods inputs, while child care services also
increase as long as they are substitutes with home inputs.
Complementarity can lead to a potentially surprising response by families. Specifically, it can cause
families to increase parental time investments even when the opportunity cost of time (i.e., the skill
price) rises. Intuitively, the increase in family income associated with higher wages can spur families to
increase total investments, and if investments are sufficiently complementary, families will want to increase
all investment inputs, including parental time. Indeed, simulations based on the elasticities (and other
parameters) we estimate below suggest that this is the case (for borrowing constrained families, at least).
20This proposition and the two that follow require that current family debts (−At) are not too large. In the constrained
case, the required conditions are always satisfied if borrowing constraints are not growing in discounted present value (i.e.,
At−1,min ≥ (1 + r)−1At,min). In the unconstrained case, the conditions are always satisfied if the current value of debts does
not exceed the discounted present value of all future non-labor income (and spousal earnings for two-parent households);
however, several results rely on much weaker conditions. For example, Proposition 6 only requires that the value of current
debt not exceed the discounted present value of all future family wages and non-labor income, as well as the value of human
capital after period T . See Appendix A for details.
21A permanent change in the skill price has the same qualitative impacts on inputs, as does a change in only the current
skill price.
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3.3.2 Effects of Mother’s Human Capital on Investment Inputs
Finally, we study the effects of maternal human capital on child investment input decisions, continuing
to assume am(Hm) = ām[ϕm(Hm)]
ρ and ag(Hm) = āg[ϕg(Hm)]
ρ with ϕm(Hm) and ϕg(Hm) defined in
Equations (11) and (12).
The relationship between both home goods and time investments and mother’s human capital depends
quite generally on ϕ̄m and ϕ̄g as well as the substitutability of different inputs. These conditions are
difficult to interpret on their own, so we discuss two special cases that provide greater intuition. (See
Appendix A for the general case.)
Begin by assuming that a mother’s human capital does not impact the productivity of home goods
inputs. Whether time invested in children rises or falls with mother’s human capital depends on the substi-
tutability of investments and the returns to her skill associated with time investment in child development
as described in the next proposition.
Proposition 7. Suppose ϕ̄g = 0. Home goods inputs, g, are strictly increasing in Hm and maternal time
investment, τm, is strictly decreasing in Hm if any of the following conditions are met: (i) ϕ̄m < 1 and
ρ ≥ γ ≥ 0, (ii) ϕ̄m = 1, or (iii) ϕ̄m > 1 and ρ ≤ γ ≤ 0.
Compared to what we see with expenditure shares, there is an additional positive effect of maternal
human capital on input levels from the increase in family income. Of course, the own-price effect tends to
reduce the amount of time investment even though its expenditure share may rise. When maternal skills
are equally productive in child-rearing and the labor market (i.e., ϕm(·) is CRS), an increase in maternal
human capital causes families to substitute more goods investments for less time investments, leaving
expenditure shares unchanged (see Section 3.1.2). We observe a qualitatively similar shift from parental
time to home goods inputs when ϕm(·) exhibits increasing (decreasing) returns to scale and inputs are
substitutable (complementary) with stronger substitutability (complementarity) between parental time
and home goods inputs than between the composite home input and market child care.
Next, consider ϕ̄g > 0, so the productivity of home goods investment is increasing in maternal human
capital. Recall from Section 3.1.2 that the increase in marginal productivity encourages more skilled
mothers to shift their investment portfolio towards home goods if inputs are sufficiently substitutable;
otherwise, the factor-augmenting nature of Hm can cause them to turn more to other inputs. To focus
on the productivity effects of maternal human capital on home goods investment, we consider the case of
ϕ̄m = 1, which implies equal productivity of Hm at home and in the labor market.
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Proposition 8. Suppose ϕ̄m = 1 (ϕm is CRS) and ϕ̄g > 0. If ρ ≥ γ ≥ 0, then home goods investment is
strictly increasing in Hm and parental time investment is strictly decreasing in Hm.
Comparing this result to Proposition 7, we see that a positive effect of Hm on the productivity of
goods inputs tends to dampen the substitution we see from parental time investment towards home goods
investments: with ϕ̄g > 0, we can only be assured of this substitution if ρ ≥ γ ≥ 0 even when ϕm(·) is
CRS. This same condition ensures an analogous shift in expenditure shares (see Proposition 3), with the
marginal productivity effect dominating the factor-augmenting effect under sufficient substitutability.
Throughout this section, we have analytically characterized the impacts of both input prices and
parental human capital on family investments in children, emphasizing empirically quantifiable relation-
ships for specific input amounts, input expenditure shares, and total investment expenditures. These
relationships depend critically on the substitutability of different inputs and on the role of parental hu-
man capital in the production of child skills. We next turn to estimation strategies aimed at identifying
these characteristics of the production process from rich data on investment choices, parental skills and
other factors that might affect the productivity of investments, and measures of child skills.
4 Estimation Approach
Our empirical analysis adopts a revealed preference approach that exploits relative demand for inputs
to estimate the within-period production function ft(·) described in Section 3.1. An important advantage
of this approach is that it requires no assumptions about the dynamics of skill production (as given by
Ht(·)) or about credit markets. An implicit assumption is that families are knowledgeable about the
within-period skill production process. More generally, this approach identifies individual beliefs about
the skill production function, which is important for understanding how families might react to different
policies.
Molnar (2020) and Moschini (2020) also use this revealed preference approach to estimate intratemporal
features of a more limited production technology with a single unknown elasticity of substitution between
inputs. Our richer child production technology with three distinct types of inputs and flexible substitution
patterns across those inputs introduces additional challenges when inputs are measured with error. We
address this measurement error, as well as measurement error in wages, and employ a few different
approaches to address unobserved heterogeneity in parenting skills and selection into work.22
22Moschini (2020) takes a time fixed effects approach to address unobserved heterogeneity (and selection into work among
parents). To address endogeneity concerns, Molnar (2020) exploits the introduction of a universal child care subsidy in Quebec
as an instrument for relative price changes. In related work, Abbott (2020) specifies a similar relative demand function (for his
two inputs, time and goods), but he addresses unobserved heterogeneity through estimation of a full dynamic lifecycle model.
Unfortunately, this forfeits an important strength of the revealed preference approach, which does not require assumptions
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After estimating the within-period skill production process ft(·) using relative demands, we then
impose additional structure on the intertemporal production process, combined with assumptions about
credit markets, to estimate both ft(·) and Ht(·) simultaneously.
4.1 Within-Period Production Function, ft(·)
We begin by describing our relative demand approach for estimating ft(·). Let Zi,t reflect a set of
observed household characteristics for child i at date t, including parental characteristics (e.g., marital
status, education, age, race), child characteristics (e.g., age), and other household demographic factors
(e.g., number of children in the household). We also consider unobserved heterogeneity in the productivity
of parent’s time with children, ηm,i and ηf,i.
We estimate the following nested CES within-period production function:
f(τm,i, τf,i, gi, Yi|Zi,t) =
[(
am(Zi,t, ηm,i)τ
ρ
m,i,t + af (Zi,t, ηf,i)τ
ρ
f,i,t + ag(Zi,t)g
ρ
i,t
) γ
ρ
+ aYc(Zi,t)Y
γ
c,i,t
] 1
γ
,
assuming aj(Z, ηj) = exp(Zφj + ηj) for j = m, f and ag(Z) = exp(Zφg) (allowing φm and φg to differ
for single and married mothers).23 We assume af (Z) = 0 (and exclude father characteristics from Zi,t)
for single mother households, because we do not generally observe much, if anything, about fathers in
these cases. Additionally, we impose φj = 0 for coefficients on some characteristics (e.g., one parent’s
age or education does not affect the productivity of the other parent’s time). Finally, a normalization is
required on the share constants (am, af , aYc), because the scale of f(·) is not pinned down. In estimation,
we normalize aYc(Z) = 1 as discussed further below.
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To link our assumptions on am(Z, ηm) and af (Z, ηf ) to our theoretical analysis of Section 3, suppose
human capital for parent j ∈ {m, f} is given by Hj,i,t = exp(Zi,tΓj + λ−1ηj,i). This implies ln(Wj,i,t) =
ln(wj,i,t) + Zi,tΓj + λ
−1ηj,i, where wj,i,t is the price of skill in parent (j, i)’s labor market. For φj/Γj =
λ = ρϕ̄j , we can write aj(Z, ηj) = ā(ϕj(Hj))
ρ = H
ρϕ̄j
j , consistent with our theoretical analysis. Thus, the
importance of parental education for child production scaled by ρ (i.e., φj/ρ) relative to log wages (Γj) is
the empirical counterpart to the “returns to scale” parameter ϕ̄j central to several results in Section 3.
Our empirical analysis recognizes that investment inputs, as well as parental wage rates, may be
measured with error. We use an o superscript to reflect observed measures of these variables, assuming
about preferences or dynamic features of the environment.
23One could also allow production parameters ρ and γ to vary with time or household characteristics (e.g., child age);
however, we refrain from this given the PSID-CDS sample sizes and limited child age range used in our analysis.
24This normalization is natural, because most household characteristics (e.g., parental age or education, number of children
in the household) are unlikely to directly effect the productivity of market child care services, while they are more likely to
directly influence the productivity of household inputs. Regardless, with a full child production function Ht(ft(·), θ,Ψt) that
is multiplicatively separable in θ and ft(·), as we will assume, the normalization aYc(Z) = 1 means that any factors affecting
the productivity of child care services will come through θ.
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ln(xoi,t) = ln(xi,t) + ξx,i,t for x ∈ {τm, τf , g, Yc,Wm,Wf}. We assume that all idiosyncratic measurement
errors are mean zero and independent of all “true” variables (inputs, prices, as well as Zi,t characteristics),
unobserved heterogeneity (ηm,i, ηf,i), and other measurement errors.
Next, define wages and child care prices relative to the price of investment goods: W̃j,i,t ≡ Wj,i,t/pi,t,
W̃ oj,i,t ≡ W oj,i,t/pi,t, P̃i,t ≡ Pc,i,t/pi,t. It is also convenient to define the ratio of observed expenditures on
parental time and child care relative to observed expenditures on household goods:
Rj,i,t ≡
W oj,i,tτ
o
j,i,t
pi,tgoi,t
, for j ∈ {m, f}, and RYc,i,t ≡
Pc,i,tY
o
c,i,t
pi,tgoi,t
.
4.1.1 Relative Demand for Parental Time vs. Household Goods
Based on Equation (5), relative demand for parental time vs. household goods (for working parents)
is given by
ln
(
τj,i,t
gi,t
)
=
(
1
1− ρ
)
ln
(
aj(Zi,t, ηj,i)
ag(Zi,t)
)
+
(
1
ρ− 1
)
ln W̃j,i,t, j = {m, f}.
Substituting in our assumptions for aj(·) and ag(·), incorporating measurement error, and adding ln W̃ oj,i,t
to both sides implies the following estimating equation for relative time vs. goods expenditures:
ln(Rj,i,t) = Z
′
i,tφ̃jg +
(
ρ
ρ− 1
)
ln W̃ oj,i,t + η̃j,i + ξτj/g,i,t + ξ̃Wj ,i,t, (26)
where φ̃jg ≡
(
1
1−ρ
)
(φj − φg), η̃j,i ≡
(
1
1−ρ
)
ηj,i, ξτj/g,i,t ≡ ξτj ,i,t − ξg,i,t, and ξ̃Wj ,i,t ≡
(
1
1−ρ
)
ξWj ,i,t. This
shows how relative time vs. goods expenditures depend on their relative prices, as well as characteristics
that affect their relative productivity. Because ρ < 1, household characteristics that raise the productivity
of time relative to goods inputs (i.e., Zi,t for which φj > φg) will lead to greater relative time investment
expenditures, where the effect also depends on the elasticity of substitution between time and goods.
Note that this elasticity can be obtained easily from the coefficient on log relative wages, because ετ,g =
1−
(
ρ
ρ−1
)
.
Three potential econometric challenges arise in estimation of Equation (26). First, unobserved differ-
ences in parenting skills ηj,i may be correlated with wages Wj,i,t.
25 This would be the case if skills valued
in the labor market are also productive in child-rearing, as discussed above. Second, measurement error in
wages is correlated with observed wages. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of Equation (26) for any
period t will produce estimates of
(
ρ
ρ−1
)
with an asymptotic bias of
(
1
1−ρ
)(
Cov(ηj,i,ln(W̃j,i,t)|Zi,t)−V ar(ξWj,i,t|Zi,t)
V ar(ln(W̃ oj,i,t)|Zi,t)
)
.
Notice that measurement error in log wages does not necessarily produce the standard attenuation bias
25We assume throughout that unobserved parenting skills, ηi,j , are independent of household goods and child care prices
(pi,t, Pc,i,t).
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towards zero, because we use relative expenditures, which are functions of potentially mismeasured wages,
as our dependent variable.26 Instead, measurement error produces a negative OLS bias for ρ/(ρ − 1)
(upward bias for ετ,g) while a positive correlation between market and child skill production produces an
opposing bias. A third challenge also arises due to unobserved heterogeneity in ηj,i due to selection into
work, because we do not observe wages for those who do not work at all during the year.
The first two estimation concerns can be addressed using standard instrumental variables techniques.27
Below, we use state of residence indicators as instruments, assuming that unobserved differences in parental
child production abilities are the same across states (conditional on other observed factors like parental
age, education, and race). From consistent estimation of Equation (26), we can obtain estimates of ρ (and
elasticity ετ,g) as well as (φj − φg) for j ∈ {m, f}.
Concerns about selection into work arise if unobserved parental child-rearing skills are correlated with
labor supply decisions. To address this issue, one could consider a control function approach (Heckman and
Robb Jr, 1985), modeling the expected value of ηi,j conditional on log relative wages, Zi,t characteristics,
and other exogenous factors that impact labor supply behavior. Based on our model, these additional
excluded variables could include factors like state of residence (determining the price of skill in the market),
family assets or non-wage income, or factors affecting the child productivity parameter θ. All would
potentially affect labor supply, hj,i,t, but are excluded from the relative demand for parental time vs.
household goods inputs. Unfortunately, without strong assumptions, it is difficult to derive a simple
single index equation that would make a propensity score approach practical, especially if there are any
additional unobserved factors affecting θ or preferences for leisure. We instead address selection concerns
in three ways. First, we estimate Equation (26) conditioning on parents with a high predicted probability
of work as described further below. As this predicted probability approaches one, such estimates should
be consistent. Second, we use the panel nature of our data to estimate log wage fixed effects for each
individual parent. This provides an estimate of unobserved parental skills, which we include in our set
of observed factors affecting relative demand. Third, our estimation of relative demand for child care
vs. household goods inputs, discussed next, is not confounded by selection into work. This provides an
additional set of estimates for ρ that can be compared against those from Equation (26).
26Measurement error would lead to attenuation bias if we regressed log relative inputs ln(τoj,i,t/g
o
i,t) rather than log relative
expenditures Rj,i,t on observed log relative wages.
27With at least two periods of data, a time fixed effects strategy can be used to address unobserved heterogeneity ηj,i as
in Moschini (2020); however, this would likely exacerbate concerns about measurement error in wages. Because we estimate
Equation (26) using a single period of data, we do not discuss fixed effects strategies further.
29
4.1.2 Relative Demand for Child Care vs. Household Goods
Based on Equation (6), relative demand for child care vs. household goods implies the following for
single mothers:
ln(RYc,i,t) =
(
1
1− γ
)
ln aYc(Zi,t)+Z
′
i,tφ̃g+
[
γ − ρ
ρ(γ − 1)
]
ln
(
1 +Rm,i,te
−ξWmτm/g,i,t
)
+
(
γ
γ − 1
)
ln P̃c,i,t+ξYc/g,i,t,
(27)
where ξτmWm/g,i,t ≡ ξτm,i,t + ξWm,i,t − ξg,i,t, and ξYc/g,i,t ≡ ξYc,i,t − ξg,i,t, and
φ̃g ≡
[
γ
ρ(γ − 1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 if max{ρ, γ}<0
φg.
As noted above, we normalize aYc(Z) = 1. This implies that when both γ and ρ are negative (as our
estimates below suggest), family characteristics that raise the productivity of household goods inputs will
lead to reductions in expenditures on child care relative to household goods, because φ̃g < 0.
28 The
elasticity of substitution between the composite home input and market child care can be obtained from
the coefficient on log relative child care prices, because εY,H = 1−
(
γ
γ−1
)
. In the rest of this subsection,
we set aYc = 1 and drop t subscripts to simplify expressions.
In the absence of measurement error in (Wm,iτm,i/gi), ξWmτm/g,i = 0 and Equation (27) becomes
ln(RYc,i) = Z
′
iφ̃g +
[
γ − ρ
ρ(γ − 1)
]
ln (1 +Rm,i) +
(
γ
γ − 1
)
ln P̃c,i + ξYc/g,i, (28)
which can be estimated via OLS.
A two-step estimation approach that accounts for measurement error in all child investment inputs
is possible if (i) wages are not measured with error (i.e., ξWm,i = 0) and (ii) there is no unobserved
heterogeneity in maternal child production ability (i.e., ηm,i = 0). Under these assumptions, we obtain a
similar specification:
ln(RYc,i) = Z
′
iφ̃g +
[
γ − ρ
ρ(γ − 1)
]
ln
(
1 + eln(Φ̃m,i)
)
+
(
γ
γ − 1
)
ln P̃c,i + ξYc/g,i, (29)
where we define Φ̃j,i ≡ Wj,iτj,ipigi generally for both mothers and fathers j = m, f . Absent measurement
error in wages and unobserved heterogeneity in maternal child productivity, the predicted values from OLS
28While it is natural to think that parental characteristics and household demographic factors do not directly affect the
productivity of child care services, it is possible that child care productivity depends on child characteristics like age. Given
that our specification for Ht(ft(·), θ,Ψt) is multiplicative in θ, normalizing aYc(Z) to a constant means that these productivity
effects would appear in θ, offset by adjustments in φj and φg. Alternatively, we could normalize θ to a constant invariant to
Z, allowing aYc(Z) = Z
′φYc . In this case, Equation (27) would identify φ̃g =
1
1−γ
(
φYc − γρφg
)
, so the estimated effects of
characteristics like child’s age on relative demand for child care services vs. household goods identify the effects of child’s age
on the productivity of child care relative to goods inputs (the latter scaled by γ/ρ).
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estimation of Equation (26), ̂ln(Rm,i), provide consistent estimates of ln(Φ̃m,i) = Z ′iφ̃mg +
(
ρ
ρ−1
)
ln W̃m,i.
Thus, we can substitute these predicted values in for ln(Φ̃m,i) in Equation (29) and estimate it using OLS.
Consistent estimates of γ, ρ, and φg can be obtained from estimation of Equations (28) or (29) under
the stated assumptions. Combining these estimates from those of Equation (26), estimates of φm can also
be obtained.
Measurement error in wages as well as inputs complicates estimation. However, taking expectations
of Equation (27) conditional on observed data produces
E
[
ln(RYc,i)
∣∣∣Zi, Rm,i, P̃c,i, goi ]
= Z ′iφ̃g +
[
γ−ρ
ρ(γ−1)
]
E
[
ln
(
1 +Rm,ie
−ξWmτm/g,i
) ∣∣∣Rm,i]+ ( γγ−1) ln P̃c,i − E[ξg,i|goi ].
If the distribution of measurement error in (Wm,i, τm,i, gi) is fully known, we can simply calculate the
expectations on the right-hand side of the expression and use GMM to estimate (γ, ρ, φg). In some
cases, we only need to know the type of distribution for measurement errors, not all parameters of the
distributions. For example, if ξg,i and ln(gi) are both normally distributed (and independent), then
E[ξg,i|goi ] = V ar(ξg,i)
(
ln(goi )− E[ln(goi )]
V ar(ln(goi ))
)
and
E
[
ln(RYc,i)
∣∣∣Zi, Rm,i, P̃c,i, goi ]
= Z ′iφ̃g +
[
γ−ρ
ρ(γ−1)
]
E
[
ln
(
1 +Rm,ie
−ξWmτm/g,i
)∣∣∣Rm,i]+ ( γγ−1) ln P̃c,i + λ( ln goi − E[ln goi ]), (30)
where λ ≡ −V ar(ξg,i)/V ar(ln goi ). Further assuming that both ξWm,i and ξτm,i are also normally dis-
tributed implies that ξWmτm/g,i ∼ N
(
0, σ2Wmτm/g
)
. In this case, we could integrate over this measure-
ment error to calculate the expectation term on the right-hand side of Equation (30) as a function of(
Rm,i, σ
2
Wmτm/g
)
.29 Equation (30) could then be estimated using GMM where λ and σ2Wmτm/g must be
estimated along with (γ, ρ, φg).
Unfortunately, E
[
ln
(
1 +Rm,ie
−ξWmτm/g,i
)∣∣∣Rm,i] in Equation (30) does not have a closed form expres-
sion. Using a second-order Taylor approximation to integrate over measurement error produces
E
[
ln(RYc,i)
∣∣∣Zi, Rm,i, P̃c,i, goi ] ≈ Z ′iφ̃g + ( γ − ρρ(γ − 1)
)
ln (1 +Rm,i) + σ
2
Wmτm/g
(
γ − ρ
ρ(γ − 1)
)(
Rm,i
2(1 +Rm,i)2
)
+
(
γ
γ − 1
)
ln(P̃c,i) + λ (ln(g
o
i )− E[ln(goi )]) , (31)
29In general, ξWm,i and ξτm,i need not be normally distributed. Knowledge of their distributions should be sufficient to
calculate the expectation term.
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where σ2Wmτm/g ≡ V ar(ξτmWm/g,i). While this expression is only an approximation, it does not require
any knowledge of the distribution for (ξWm,i, ξτm,i). A GMM approach can be applied to Equation (31) to
estimate technology parameters (γ, ρ, φg) as well as (σ
2
Wmτm/g
, λ). Notice that OLS regression of ln(RYc,i)
on Zi, ln (1 +Rm,i),
(
Rm,i
2(1+Rm,i)2
)
, ln(P̃c,i,t), and (ln(g
o
i )− E[ln(goi )]) can also be used to obtain consistent
estimates. It is noteworthy that σ2Wmτm/g is only identified when γ 6= ρ. For very similar γ and ρ, we
would expect imprecise estimates of this variance in practice.
An analogous set of results applies for two-parent households; however, the estimating equations are
slightly more complicated due to the roles of both father’s and mother’s time inputs. Continuing to
normalize aYc = 1, relative demand for child care vs. goods in two-parent families implies
lnRYc,i = Z
′
iφ̃g +
[
γ − ρ
ρ(γ − 1)
]
ln
(
1 +Rf,ie
−ξWfτf /g,i +Rm,ie
−ξWmτm/g,i
)
+
(
γ
γ − 1
)
ln P̃c,i + ξYc/g,i, (32)
where ξτfWf/g,i ≡ ξτf ,i + ξWf ,i − ξg,i and other variables are defined earlier.
No measurement error in (Wj,iτj,i/gi) for j ∈ {m, f} implies
ln(RYc,i) = Z
′
iφ̃g +
[
γ − ρ
ρ(γ − 1)
]
ln (1 +Rf,i +Rm,i) +
(
γ
γ − 1
)
ln P̃c,i + ξYc/g,i, (33)
which can be estimated via OLS.
Alternatively, incorporating measurement error in all child investment inputs but assuming (i) wages
for both parents are measured without error (i.e., ξWm,i = ξWf ,i = 0) and (ii) no unobserved heterogeneity
in either parent’s child production ability (i.e., ηm,i = ηf,i = 0) yields the following:
ln(RYc,i) = Z
′
iφ̃g +
[
γ − ρ
ρ(γ − 1)
]
ln
(
1 + eln(Φ̃fi) + eln(Φ̃m,i)
)
+
(
γ
γ − 1
)
ln P̃c,i + ξYc/g,i. (34)
As with single mothers, the stated assumptions enable a two-step approach for estimating Equation (34),
using predicted values from OLS estimation of Equation (26) for both fathers and mothers, ̂ln(Rj,i), in
place of ln(Φ̃j,i) for j ∈ {m, f}.
As with single mothers, we can address measurement error in wages and inputs, as well as unob-
served heterogeneity in maternal and paternal child productivity, by taking expectations of Equation (32)
conditional on observed data:
E
[
lnRYc,i
∣∣∣Zi, Rf,i, Rm,i, P̃c,i, goi ]
= Z ′iφ̃g +
[
γ−ρ
ρ(γ−1)
]
E
[
ln
(
1 +Rf,ie
−ξWfτf /g,i +Rm,ie
−ξWmτm/g,i
) ∣∣∣Rf,i, Rm,i]+ ( γγ−1) ln P̃c,i − E[ξg,i|goi ].
Knowledge of measurement error distributions would allow for direct calculation of the conditional expec-
tation terms on the right-hand side. Alternatively, a second-order Taylor approximation to integrate over
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measurement error and ξg,i ∼ N(0, σ2g) yields
E
[
lnRYc,i
∣∣∣Zi, Rf,i, Rm,i, P̃c,i, goi ] ≈ Z ′iφ̃g + [ γ − ρρ(γ − 1)
]
ln (1 +Rf,i +Rm,i)
+ σ2Wf τf
[
γ−ρ
ρ(γ−1)
] (
Rf,i(1+Rm,i)
2(1+Rf,i+Rm,i)2
)
+ σ2Wmτm
[
γ−ρ
ρ(γ−1)
] (
Rm,i(1+Rf,i)
2(1+Rf,i+Rm,i)2
)
+ σ2g
[
γ−ρ
ρ(γ−1)
](
Rf,i+Rm,i
2(1+Rf,i+Rm,i)
2
)
− σ2g
(
ln(gi)
o−E[ln(goi )]
V ar(ln(goi ))
)
+
(
γ
γ−1
)
ln(P̃c,i), (35)
where σ2Wjτj ≡ V ar(ξWj+ξτj ) for j ∈ {m, f}.
30 Based on this moment condition, GMM can be used to effi-
ciently estimate the technology parameters (γ, ρ, φg) and measurement error variances
(
σ2Wmτm/g, σ
2
Wmτm/g
, σ2g
)
.
OLS can also be used; however, there may be some efficiency loss by not imposing parameter restrictions
across terms.31
It is important to note that unobserved parenting skill ηi,j does not appear in any of the estimating
equations for child care vs. household goods relative demand. As a consequence, these estimates are not
subject to concerns about unobserved heterogeneity or parental selection into work. Several specifications,
therefore, provide a set of consistent estimates for ρ that can be compared against those obtained from
estimation of relative demand for parental time vs. household goods (i.e., Equation (26)).
4.2 Intertemporal Skill Production Function, Ht(·)
To jointly estimate all parameters of the child production function (i.e., those of both ft(·) and Ht(·)),
we combine moment conditions implied by intratemporal optimality, intertemporal optimality, and the
intertemporal relationship between investment inputs and child skill accumulation. The additional use
of intertemporal relationships is necessary for estimation of dynamic productivity parameters in Ht(·).
Given our data, this requires additional assumptions on preferences and the structure of Ht(·) (i.e., As-
sumptions 1–3), as well as assumptions about credit markets. These additional moments not only allow
for identification of parameters defined in Ht(·), but also provide additional information about parameters
in ft(·), which can improve efficiency. For this analysis, we consider measurement error only in inputs
(not wages) and abstract from unobserved heterogeneity in factor shares. Thus, our expressions for factor
shares reduce to aj(Zi,t) = exp(Zi,tφj,it), j ∈ {m, f, g}, while we continue to normalize aYc = 1.
30As with the case for single mothers, these time expenditure measurement error variances are only identified when γ 6= ρ.
31Specifically, OLS would produce two separate estimates of σ2g , while GMM would take advantage of the cross-term
restrictions on parameters.
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4.2.1 Intratemporal Moments
As before, we use the intratemporal conditions based on Equations (5) and (6) to express the ratio of
any two observed inputs x1 and x2, given prices Πi,t and parental marital status, Mi,t ∈ {0, 1}:
ln
(
x1,i,t
x2,i,t
)
= ln (Φx1,x2(Πi,t,Mi,t)) + ξx1,i,t − ξx2,i,t, x1, x2 ∈ {τ om, τ of , Y oc , go}.
Assuming measurement error is independently distributed across individuals, we define the first set of
moments as
E
([
ln
(
x1,i,t
x2,i,t
)
− ln(Φx1,x2(Πi,t,Mi,t))
]
ZΦ,x1,x2,i,t
)
= 0, (36)
where the pair of inputs (x1, x2) is chosen from the set of available comparisons at time t, the time period
t is from 1997 (t = 0) or 2002 (t = 5), and the vector ZΦ,x1,x2,i,t is the set of instruments chosen for this
equation as described below in Section 6.2. For each child i, we stack moments from Equation (36) for
each input ratio and year.
4.2.2 Intertemporal Moments
We address several practical challenges in using intertemporal moments related to child skill accumu-
lation: (i) child skill measures are not observed every year, (ii) investment inputs are not observed every
year, and (iii) inputs and child skill levels are measured with error.
Our data allow the comparison of child human capital measures 5 years apart. We denote Ψ̃i,t ≡ ln(Ψi,t)
and iterate on the Cobb-Douglas dynamic specification for human capital production (see Assumption 2)
to obtain
Ψ̃i,5 =
4∑
t=0
δ4−t2 [δ1 ln(Xi,t) + ln(θi,t)] + δ
5
2Ψ̃i,0,
where we embed age variation in Ht(·) in the individual productivity parameter θi,t. Because total
investment Xi,t is not directly observed, we first use the results of Section 3.1 to derive an expression
for the ratio of time inputs τj to composite input X, denoted Φj,X , which is a known function of prices,
Πi,t, marital status, Mi,t, and technology parameters.
32 Allowing for measurement error in τj,i,t gives the
relationship:
τ oj,i,t = Φj,X(Πi,t,Mi,t)Xi,t exp(ξj,i,t), j ∈ {m, f}.
This would, in principle, allow us to estimate the outcome equation using time investment as a proxy for
total investment (subject to accounting for measurement error). However, because inputs are only observed
5 years apart, we must impute them for the intervening periods. To do this, we use the solution for optimal
32The approach freely generalizes to the use of other inputs, but our preferred estimates use time use as the investment
proxy given its prominence in the share of investment expenditures.
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investment based on the two cases described in Section 3.2: (i) non-binding borrowing constraints and (ii)
no savings or borrowing.
Using the intertemporal optimality condition for total investments when borrowing constraints do not
bind from Equation (22), we write period t+ 5 outcomes in terms of period t investments:
Ψ̃i,5 =
4∑
t=0
δ4−t2
[
δ1t ln
(
1 + r
δ2
)
+ Zi,tφθ
]
+
4∑
t=0
δ4−t2 δ1
[
ln
(
pi,0τ
o
j,i,0
pi,tΦj,X(Πi,0,Mi,0)
)
− ξj,i,0
]
+ δ52Ψ̃i,0, (37)
where we assume θi,t = exp(Zi,tφθ).
33 Similarly, when no borrowing or saving is permitted, Equation (21)
implies that period t+ 5 outcomes can be written as
Ψ̃i,5 =
4∑
t=1
δ4−t2
[
δ1 ln
(
Kt
1 + ψm + ψf +Kt
)
+ Zi,tφθ
]
+
4∑
t=1
δ4−t2 δ1 ln
(
Wm,i,t +Wf,i,t + yi,t
pi,t
)
+ δ42δ1
[
ln
(
τ0j,i,0
Φj,X(Πi,0,Mi,0)
)
− ξj,i,0
]
+ δ5Ψ̃i,0. (38)
To finish, the estimation procedure must address measurement error in child human capital. In the
PSID-CDS, we use two age-normalized measures of cognitive ability from the Letter-Word (LWi,t) and
Applied Problems (APi,t) modules of the Woodcock-Johnson aptitude test. We write the measurement
equations as
Si,t = λSΨ̃i,t + ξ̃S,i,t, S ∈ {LW,AP}, t ∈ {0, 5},
where the periods of measurement t correspond to the 1997 and 2002 waves of the PSID-CDS. These
measurement assumptions require a normalization on the factor loading for one measure, as in Cunha,
Heckman, and Schennach (2010). We set λLW = 1, leaving the factor loading on the Applied Problems
score (λAP ) to be identified. Collecting error terms, we can write the final outcome equations using both
scores S ∈ {LW,AP} and the time investment of parent j ∈ {m, f} under non-binding constraints as
λ−1S Si,5 = Zi,0φ̃θ +
4∑
t=0
δ4−t2 δ1 ln
(
pi,0τ
o
i,0
pi,tΦj,X(Πi,0,Mi,0)
)
+ δ52λ
−1
S Si,0 + ξS,j,i (39)
and alternatively for the no borrowing/saving case as
λ−1S Si,5 = Zi,0φ̃θ +
4∑
t=1
δ4−t2 δ1 ln
(
Wm,i,t +Wf,i,t + yi,t
pi,t
)
+ δ42δ1 ln
(
τ0j,i,0
Φj,X(Πi,0,Mi,0)
)
+ δ5λ−1S Si,0 + ξS,j,i.
(40)
33Our strategy naturally accommodates (potentially stochastic) unobserved variation in θi,t that is independent of
(Zi,0, ..., Zi,4) characteristics and mean independent of (Ψ̃i,0, τi,0), measurement errors, and input prices (as well as parental
wages and non-labor income in the case with no borrowing/saving) conditional on (Zi,0, ..., Zi,4).
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In each case, the term Zi,0φ̃θ absorbs the first summation term in Equations (37) and (38).
34 We assume
that the full vector of error terms ξi,t is independent of ξi,t′ for t 6= t′, and that within a time period, the
measurement error in Letter-Word scores (ξ̃LW,i,t) is independent of the measurement error in Applied
Problems (ξ̃AP,i,t).
35 No other restrictions on covariances are imposed here. For notational convenience,
we write the outcome Equations (39) and (40) as
Si,5 = GS,j(τj,i,0,Πi,Mi,t) + ξS,j,i, j ∈ {m, f}, S ∈ {LW,AP}
and use the following vector of moments for estimation:
E ([Si,5 −GS,j(τj,i,0,Πi,Mi,t)]ZS,i) = 0, j ∈ {m, f}, ∀S ∈ {AP,LW}, (41)
where the instrument set ZS,i is described in Section 6.2.
In order to identify the factor loading λAP , we use the assumption that measurement error is indepen-
dent over time to write:
λAP =
Cov(APi,5, LWi,0)
Cov(LWi,5, LWi,0)
, λ2AP =
Cov(APi,5, APi,0)
Cov(LWi,5, LWi,0)
.
Because we normalize our measurements to have mean zero, these two identifying conditions can be written
as the following pair of moments:
E [(APi,5 − λAPLWi,5)LWi,0] = 0 and E
[
APi,5APi,0 − λ2APLWi,5LWi,0
]
= 0. (42)
We estimate the model by stacking the vector of moment conditions on input ratios described in Equa-
tion (36), the vector of moment conditions implied by outcomes in Equation (41), and the moment
conditions derived from measurement assumptions in Equation (42).
5 Data Sources and Construction
We construct a panel dataset on family work behavior, investment in children, and child outcomes
from the PSID-CDS. The PSID is a dynastic longitudinal survey taken annually from 1968 to 1997 and
biennially since 1997. The main interview of this survey collects household-level data on economic and
demographic variables. The CDS consists of three waves, collected in 1997, 2002, and 2007. The youngest
two children in a PSID household between the ages of 0 and 12 at the time of the 1997 survey were
34The only time-varying Zi,t affecting θi,t in our empirical analysis is the child’s age, which allows us to write the entire
first term in Equation (37) as a linear function of Zi,0. In Equation (38), the first term depends on additional structural
parameters (α, β, r, ψm, ψf ); however, it is only necessary to estimate age-specific intercept terms that absorb all of these
expressions. We use a linear term in age as a first-order approximation.
35This assumption permits our instrumenting strategy described below, which addresses the correlation between measure-
ment error ξS,j,i and Si,0 due to ξ̃S,i,0.
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considered eligible for interview in the supplement. We summarize the sources and methods of variable
construction from this dataset below, while Table 5 provides an overview.
Our estimation approach also requires merging these data with price variables for home-based goods
and child care inputs. We construct these variables by combining several data sources, as described in the
final section of this discussion.
5.1 Parental Investment and Child Outcomes from the PSID-CDS
In each wave of the CDS, a Primary Caregiver (PCG) and Other Caregiver (OCG) are identified in
the household. The Child, the PCG, and the OCG each complete a module of the survey.
Cognitive Outcomes In all three waves of the survey, several assessments of cognitive and socioemo-
tional development are collected for children. We use the Letter-Word (LW) and Applied Problems scores
from the Woodcock-Johnson battery of tests, which are completed by children ages 3 and older. We use
the age-normed scores provided by the PSID from the 1997 and 2002 waves.
Time Investment Measures on time investment come from time diaries completed by CDS children,
with assistance from the PCG when necessary. This portion of the survey requires participants to record
a detailed, minute-by-minute timeline of their activities for one random weekday and one random day of
the weekend. Activities were subsequently coded at a fine level of detail. For each recorded activity, an
indicator is provided for whether the mother and/or the father are actively participating in the activity.
Our chosen measure of time investment for each parent is the weighted sum of the time each parent
actively participates in activities with the child (Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall, 2014), with the weekday
receiving weight 5/7 and the weekend day receiving weight 2/7. We construct these measures from the
1997 and 2002 time diaries.
Child care Expenditure In the 1997 and 2002 PCG interviews, respondents for children older than
age 5 answer questions about current child care arrangements, costs, and time spent in each arrangement.
For children younger than age 5, a retrospective history of arrangements is collected, from which we collect
all arrangements that are reported as ongoing. We construct a measure of weekly expenditures from these
answers.36 When this variable is either missing or unavailable, we use total household expenditures on
child care from the main interview, divided by the number of children ages 12 or younger.
36Costs are not reported in uniform units, and weekly expenditures are imputed from answers to questions on price per
time unit and the usual amounts of time in care.
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Goods Expenditures In the 2002 PCG interview, respondents answer questions on annual expendi-
tures for the child on food, clothing, vacation, school supplies, and toys. Additionally, respondents answer
questions on whether the child participates in private lessons, sports, tutoring, or community groups, along
with questions on costs of these activities. We determine weekly expenditures in all of these categories,
choosing the sum of spending on school supplies, toys, sports, tutoring, lessons, and community groups
as our preferred measure of market goods expenditure.
5.2 Household Variables from the PSID Main Interview
For each child in the CDS, we use the PSID’s childbirth record to link children with mothers, and the
PSID’s individual file to link mothers with their corresponding household interview in each year. From the
main interview, information is collected on household structure, annual household expenditures on child
care, state of residence, as well as the hours of work, earnings, race, and education of household members.
We use mothers’ childbirth history to construct the number and age of children in the household. While
the PSID is available only biennially after 1997, earnings and hours for individuals in “missing” years is
made available through supplemental interviews in years after 1997. We combine these data to construct
a panel of each mother’s marital status, race, education, state of residence, work behavior, and wages.37
When the mother is married, we use her spouse’s wages and education as the father’s wage and education
in our analysis below.
Using the large panel of wage data, we estimate parents’ log wage fixed effects from (gender-specific)
panel regressions of log wages on individual fixed effects, potential experience and experience-squared,
number of children ages 0–12, and state dummies.38 This effectively nets out differences in average wage
rates across states and provides a measure of a parent’s value in the labor market at the time he or she
leaves school.
5.3 Sample Selection
We limit the sample to mothers of working age (between 18 and 65) who were aged between 16 and 45
in the year of the child’s birth. We consider only child-year observations for children ages 12 or younger,
and for households with no more than 2 children ages 12 or younger. We exclude children whose birth
37We treat cohabiting couples as “married”. Wages are imputed as annual earnings divided by annual hours, with the
bottom and top 1% of observations dropped.
38Potential experience is given by age - education - 6. Available wage observations from all PSID survey years up to 2002
are used. Whenever we control for these fixed effects in our analysis below, we only include parents with at least 3 wage
observations available to estimate the fixed effect. After this restriction, the average number of wage observations used in
estimating the fixed effects for both mothers and fathers in our sample is slightly less than 11 (roughly 85% have 7 or more
observations).
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records indicate that they are adopted. The characteristics of families in our main sample are reported in
Table 6.
5.4 Price Variables
The estimation procedure also requires prices of child care, Pc, and prices of home-based goods, p. For
child care prices, we draw from annual reports on the cost of child care in the U.S. compiled by Child
Care Aware of America (2009–2019) to construct a state-level panel of hourly prices for 4-year-old family-
and center-based care from 2006 to 2018. We impute these prices back to 1997 using the average earnings
of child care workers in each state and year from the Current Population Survey. More details describing
this imputation procedure are provided in Appendix B.
To construct the price of home-based goods, p, we combine data on Regional Price Parities by State
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the Consumer Price Index from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Further details on the construction of this variable can also be found in Appendix B.
Our data collection results in a pair of prices, (p, Pc), for each state and year, which are merged with
our PSID-CDS panel using state of residence and calendar year for each PSID household.
6 Child Production Functions Estimates
This section presents estimates of child production functions for children from single- and two-parent
homes based on the approaches described in Section 4. Our analysis focuses on children ages 0–12 from
families with only one or two children in that age range.
Much of our analysis requires wage measures for parents; however, some parents do not work. To
alleviate concerns about selection into work, we limit our main estimation sample to parents with a
relatively high predicted probability of working. To obtain predicted probabilities of work, we estimate
separate linear probability models for working during the year (in 1997 and 2002) for single mothers,
married mothers, and married fathers. We also estimate the probability that both parents (in two-
parent households) are working. These regressions control for parental age and education, number of
children and young children in the household, age of youngest child, age of CDS child, and survey year.
(See Appendix Table D-3 for estimates.) The median (first quartile) predicted probability of work is
0.77 (0.69) for mothers and 0.91 (0.86) for fathers. Among married couples, the median (first quartile)
predicted probability that both worked was 0.71 (0.64). Except where noted, we restrict our analysis of
relative demand for parental time vs. household goods to women (men) with a predicted probability of
work no less than 0.7 (0.85). When estimating relative demand for child care vs. household goods, we
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restrict our samples to single women with a predicted probability no less than 0.7 and married couples
with a predicted probability that both work of no less than 0.65; however, selection is not generally a
concern for these specifications for reasons discussed in Section 4.
Before examining the role of parental education in the child development process, we first document
the relationship between education and wages among parents in our sample. Appendix Table D-4 reports
estimates from regressions of log wages on educational attainment, parental age and age-squared, and race
separately for mothers and fathers.39 These estimates are broadly consistent with the literature (see, e.g.,
Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2006), suggesting that parents with a college degree earn roughly 40–50%
more than those with only a high school degree.
6.1 Relative Demand Estimates
Because the CDS did not collect (adequate) information on household goods expenditures on children
in 1997, most of our analysis uses data from the 2002 CDS survey.
Table 7 reports OLS estimates of Equation (26) for all mothers accounting for potential determinants
of the productivity of mother’s time with children and/or household goods inputs. Several specifications
are shown. As discussed in Section 4, the coefficient on mother’s relative log wages provides an estimate of
ρ/(ρ−1), which equals 1−ετ,g. Near the bottom of the table, we also report estimates of ρ as implied by the
coefficients on ln(W̃m,i). Coefficients on all other variables provide estimates of φ̃mg = (φm − φg)/(1− ρ).
In addition to log relative wages, column (1) only controls for the mother’s marital status, while all
other columns also control for child’s age, whether the mother is white, the number of young children
(ages 0–5), and number of children in the household. Columns (2)–(4) also control for the mother’s age
and educational attainment. Instead of controlling for factors indirectly related to a mother’s human
capital (e.g., age and education), column (5) conditions directly on her log wage fixed effect as a measure
of her labor market productivity. (As discussed in Section 5.2, parent log wage fixed effects are based
on all available wage measures for the parent from 1968–2002.) These estimates identify the elasticity of
substitution between mother’s time and goods from the effects of current log wages conditional on long-
run average wages (reflecting both observed and unobserved parental skills). Thus, they should minimize
concerns about endogeneity bias due to unobserved heterogeneity.
Specifications that condition on maternal age and education (columns (2)–(4)) all indicate an elasticity
of substitution between maternal time and household goods inputs of roughly ετ,g = 0.45, with estimates
of ρ ranging from -1.13 to -1.31. In all of these cases, the estimates suggest that maternal time and
39Estimates for single and for married mothers do not include indicators for high school completion, because there are very
few high school dropout mothers once we restrict our sample to those with a high predicted probability of work.
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household goods are more complementary (elasticity statistically significantly different from 1) in child
production than the Cobb-Douglas case.40 Column (5), which controls for mother’s log wage fixed effects
(rather than age and education) suggests an even smaller elasticity of around 0.25.
Next, consider estimates of φ̃mg, the (scaled) effects of maternal and child characteristics on the pro-
ductivity of mother’s time relative to household goods inputs. The very general specification in column
(3) suggests that mother’s education (particularly finishing high school) increases the productivity of her
time relative to other goods inputs, while older children and those with white mothers have a lower pro-
ductivity of mother’s time relative to goods inputs compared to their younger counterparts and those with
non-white mothers. While the productivity of mother’s time relative to goods appears to be increasing
in the number of children in the household, these estimates are not statistically significant. The number
of young children has comparatively small and statistically insignificant negative effects.41 Unfortunately,
our sample contains very few mothers that are high school dropouts once we condition on a high predicted
probability of work. (Among married mothers, we have none.) Column (4), therefore, reports a specifica-
tion identical to that of column (3) but drops the indicator for high school graduate. Most estimates are
nearly identical, except now we see no effect of education — consistent with column (3), only completing
high school appears to affect the relative productivity of time to goods. Finally, column (5) continues to
show that older children with white mothers have lower relative productivity of maternal time relative
to goods. Perhaps surprisingly, mothers with higher log wage fixed effects (i.e., higher labor market pro-
ductivity) have a much lower relative productivity of time compared to goods inputs than do lower-wage
women. It is important to note that this need not imply lower productivity of mother’s time, because
higher-wage women may have a higher productivity of household goods inputs.
Table 8 reports analogous estimates of Equation (26) using state dummies as instruments for relative
log wages, assuming that the relative productivity of mother’s time vs. household goods inputs are the
same across states (or at least uncorrelated with state-level wage average rates), conditional on available
measures of mother’s human capital (e.g., age, education). The estimated elasticity of substitution between
maternal time and goods in columns (2)–(5) range from 0.22 to 0.33. While the standard errors are roughly
three times as large as their OLS counterparts, the elasticities are still significantly different from 1 (Cobb-
Douglas) once we control for maternal education or log wage fixed effects. The effects of maternal and
child characteristics are similar to their OLS counterparts reported in Table 7.
40Throughout the paper, we use a statistical significance level of 0.05 when indicating whether an estimate is statistically
significant.
41We have also estimated the specification in column (3) while including a measure of the mother’s cognitive ability (based
on a paragraph comprehension test administered to primary child caretakers in 1997). This measure had negligible effects
on relative demand and had little impact on other estimated coefficients. Because over 15% of our sample did not have a
reported score, we exclude it more generally from our analysis.
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To explore potential sample selection concerns, Appendix Table D-5 reports OLS and instrumental
variables (IV) estimates for different samples based on parents’ predicted probabilities of work. Estimates
are quite similar whether we restrict our sample to women with a higher predicted probability of work (no
less than 0.8) or whether we use the full sample of women. These results, plus the estimates from column
(5) of Tables 7 and 8, which controls for log wage fixed effects, suggest that problems related to sample
selection are likely to be minor.
In Table 9, we report estimates for the specification in column (4) of Tables 7 and 8 separately for single
and married mothers, as well as married fathers. Note that specifications for mothers (fathers) condition
on mother’s (father’s) log relative wages, education, and age. Except for the IV estimates for married
fathers, which are imprecise, the elasticity estimates are remarkably similar across the different parent
types, always suggesting greater complementarity than Cobb-Douglas. The effects of child’s age on the
productivity of parental time vs. household goods are generally negative for all parent types; however, they
are strongest and only significantly different from zero for married mothers. Married mothers with at least
some college appear to have a lower relative productivity of time vs. goods compared to mothers with only
a high school degree. Estimated differences in relative productivity of parental time vs. household goods
by parental post-secondary attainment are much smaller and insignificant for single mothers and married
fathers. While the total number of children in the household appears to raise the relative productivity
of parental time for all parents, the number of young children (ages 0–5) has strong negative effects on
the productivity of single mother’s time relative to goods inputs. No such effects of young children are
observed for married mothers or fathers. Finally, we find mixed evidence on the effect of father’s age,
with modest and statistically significant negative effects from OLS and weaker, insignificant effects from
IV estimation.
We note that standard Hausman tests fail to reject equality of OLS and IV estimates for all specifica-
tions and parent types in Tables 7–9. This, in part, reflects that state dummies are not particularly strong
instruments for relative log wages in our sample, with first-stage F-statistics generally in the range of 1-3.
Because weak/many instrument concerns would tend to bias IV estimates towards their OLS counterparts,
our findings that IV estimated elasticities ετ,g are typically even smaller (and further from 1) than our
OLS estimates strongly suggests that parental time and household goods are more complementary than a
Cobb-Douglas assumption implies. We are more reassured by the fact that our estimated elasticities (from
both OLS and IV) generally range from 0.2 to 0.5 whether we control for parental education and age or
for parental log wage fixed effects, where the latter estimates are unlikely to be biased from unobserved
heterogeneity in parental skills. (See Appendix Table D-6 for specifications with log wage fixed effects
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estimated separately for all parent types.)
We next turn to relative demand for child care services vs. household goods inputs, Equations (27)
and (32). An unfortunate practical problem arises here, because child care expenditures are frequently
unreported or zero, even among families with parents working significant hours. (By contrast, parental
time and household goods inputs are nearly always reported and positive.) Zero expenditures pose a
challenge for our estimation approach, which relies on log expenditure amounts. To better understand
who reports spending on child care, we estimate the effects of household characteristics Zi,t and the price
of child care on the probability of reporting positive expenditures. As shown in Appendix Table D-7, most
household characteristics are not predictive of who reports positive child care spending. More importantly,
child care prices have negligible effects on whether someone reports positive expenditures, despite the fact
that these prices significantly affect the amount families spend on child care (among those who report
spending) as we show below. These findings suggest that families who report spending positive amounts
on child care are fairly representative of the full sample of parents, at least based on factors we can observe.
This is consistent with many families receiving some form of free child care from family or friends, with few
household characteristics helping predict which families benefit from this support.42 With no measures
of that care, we omit these families when estimating relative demand for child care vs. household goods.
However, these families can be (and still are) used in estimating the relative demand for parental time vs.
household goods, because that tradeoff is unaffected by the availability of free (but presumably limited)
external child care.
We begin our analysis of the relative demand for child care vs. household goods inputs with simple OLS
specifications that only condition on the relative price of child care and on parent and child characteristics.
These specifications, reported in columns (1)–(3) of Tables 10 and 11, ignore the potential influence of
relative parental time vs. goods expenditures, Rm,i and Rf,i, on the relative demand for child care vs.
goods. While these specifications are not generally valid unless γ = ρ, they provide a useful benchmark.
Table 10 reports estimates for single mothers, while Table 11 reports estimates for two-parent households.
Unfortunately, sample sizes are small (and estimates often imprecise). Still, all estimated elasticities of
substitution between child care services and the home composite input, εH,Y , are less than one, several
significantly so (recall that the coefficient on ln(P̃c,i) estimates γ/(1 − γ) = 1 − εY,H). Elasticities from
specifications controlling for parental education or log wage fixed effects (columns (2) or (3)) range from
0.55 to 0.79 for single mothers and 0.36 to 0.46 for two-parent households. The elasticities are quite similar
42In 2011, 42% of children ages 0–5 whose mother was employed received child care from a grandparent, sibling, or
other relative (Laughlin, 2013). In Appendix Table D-7, the number and ages of children in the household are among the
few characteristics affecting the probability of positive child care spending, consistent with the role older siblings play in
providing child care.
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to estimated elasticities of substitution between parental time and household goods, suggesting that failure
to account for parental time relative to goods expenditures may not be very problematic. The significant
negative coefficients on child’s age (i.e., φ̃g) on the relative demand for child care indicate that the relative
productivity of household goods is greater among older children.43 The effects of post-secondary schooling
levels among parents are mixed and noisily estimated.44 Most other coefficients are modest in size and all
are statistically insignificant.
The last two columns of Tables 10 and 11 account for the effects of relative parental time vs. goods
expenditures on the relative demand for child care vs. goods when γ 6= ρ. Column (4) reports results
from estimation of Equations (28) and (33), which assume that parental time and goods inputs, as well as
wages, are not measured with error. Column (5) shows results from estimation of Equations (29) and (34),
which allow for measurement error in all child investment inputs but assume no unobserved heterogeneity
in parenting skills. Estimated elasticities of substitution between child care and the household composite
investment are similar in both cases, around 0.85 for single mothers and 0.45 for two-parent households.45
The estimated effects of child and parent characteristics on the productivity of goods inputs are similar
to those from columns (1)–(3).
Table 12 presents estimates from our most general specification of relative demand for child care services
vs. household goods inputs, Equations (31) and (35), which accounts for measurement error in inputs and
wages, as well as unobserved heterogeneity in parenting productivity. For two-parent households, we
consider a case with “Restricted Measurement Error”, which assumes σ2Wmτm = σ
2
Wf τf
.46 We reduce the
set of household characteristics that may affect ag to child’s age and parental education based on the
findings from the previous two tables and our interest in the role of parental human capital. Estimates
of the elasticity of substitution between child care services and the household composite input are quite
similar to those of Tables 10 and 11: 0.77 for single mothers and about 0.32 for two-parent households.
The estimated εY,H for two-parent households are statistically less than one. (Again, estimates for ρ are
quite noisy, though always negative, suggesting ετ,g < 1.) Turning to estimates of φ̃g, we observe more
muted (and statistically insignificant) effects of child’s age compared to previous estimates. Coefficient
43Because estimated γ and ρ are both negative, φg has the opposite sign of φ̃g.
44There is some indication of a U-shaped effect of father’s education on the relative productivity of home goods investments,
which becomes more evident when an indicator for father high school completion is included.
45As indicated near the bottom of Tables 10 and 11, it is possible to obtain estimates of ρ (and the elasticity of substitution
between parental time and goods), because the coefficients on ln(1 + Rm,i) or ln(1 + e
Φ̃m,i) (and their counterparts for
two-parent households) yield estimates of (γ − ρ)/[ρ(γ − 1)]. These can be combined with the estimates of γ obtained from
coefficients on ln(P̃c,i). Unfortunately, these estimates are quite noisy, especially for two-parent households.
46Estimated measurement error variances are not shown but are available upon request. They are very noisy, sometimes
negative, and largely uninformative (with t-statistics typically less than one). Only the coefficient on the de-meaned/scaled
measure of goods investment is fairly precisely estimated, suggesting that nearly two-thirds of the variation in ln(goi ) may
reflect measurement error.
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estimates on maternal education appear to be more positive (suggesting negative φg) than in Tables 10
and 11; however, they are far from statistically significant. Estimated effects of father’s education are
quite similar to those reported in Table 11.
An important challenge is the lack of precision for key parameters. Sample sizes in the PSID are small,
especially when restricting observations to parents with a high probability of working and to households
reporting positive expenditures on child care services. In an effort to improve efficiency from cross-
equation restrictions (i.e., ρ appears in all relative demand equations), we use GMM to estimate both sets
of relative demand equations simultaneously.47 Unfortunately, the lack of information about ρ apparent
in estimates of child care vs. goods relative demand (see Table 12) means that there is little benefit from
joint estimation of Equations (26) and (31) for single mothers.48
GMM estimates for two-parent households, reported in Table 13, are more informative. The improved
precision (relative to Tables 9 and 12) not only derives from joint estimation of both sets of relative
demand equations, but also stems from estimation of time vs. goods relative demand for both fathers and
mothers. Estimated elasticities of substitution are reported near the bottom of Table 13. The estimates
are quite robust across specifications (whether or not we instrument for log relative wages in Equation (26)
or restrict measurement error variances to be the same for both parents) and suggest that elasticities ετ,g
and εY,H are both around 0.34 to 0.41.
49 The estimated effects of child’s age on the relative productivity
of household goods, φg, are strongly positive if not quite statistically significant. Because the estimated
effects of child’s age on the relative productivity of maternal time to goods, φm − φg, is quite similar
but the opposite sign, it suggests that φm is roughly zero for child’s age. Estimated effects of mother’s
education on the productivity of her time relative to goods inputs and on goods relative to child care both
47For single mothers, we use GMM to estimate the following moments based on Equations (26) and (31): E(um,iJm,i) = 0
and E(uY,iJY,i) = 0, where
um,i = ln(Rm,i)− Z′iφ̃mg −
(
ρ
ρ− 1
)
ln W̃ om,i (43)
uY,i = ln(RY,i)− Z′iφ̃g −
(
γ − ρ
ρ(γ − 1)
)
ln (1 +Rm,i)− σ2Wmτm/g
(
γ − ρ
ρ(γ − 1)
)(
Rm,i
2(1 +Rm,i)2
)
−
(
γ
γ − 1
)
ln(P̃c,i)− λ (ln(goi )− E[ln(goi )]) , (44)
Jm,i includes all Zi characteristics in Equation (43) and either ln W̃
o
m,i or state dummies, and JY,i includes all Zi characteristics
in Equation (44), ln(1+Rm,i),
Rm,i
2(1+Rm,i)2
, ln(P̃c,i), and ln(g
o
i )−E[ln(goi )]. For two-parent households, an analogous approach
is taken based on Equation (26) for both parents and Equation (35). We use a one-step estimator with the identity weighting
matrix when using state dummies as instruments; otherwise, we use a two-step estimator with an identity matrix for the
initial weighting matrix.
48When we do not instrument for mother’s wages in the time vs. goods relative demand equation, we obtain an estimate
for ρ of -1.07 (SE=0.70) and for γ of -0.22 (SE=0.27). Instrumenting for mother’s wages produced extremely imprecise and
implausible estimates. See Appendix Table D-8.
49Because ρ and γ are estimated to be quite similar, estimated measurement error variances for time investment expendi-
tures, σ2Wjτj , are extremely noisy and not reported.
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appear to be negative, while estimated effects of father’s education are mixed.
Summarizing all of our estimates based only on relative demand, we find remarkable consistency across
specifications in the estimated elasticities of substitution between inputs: the elasticity between parental
time and home goods inputs and the elasticity between the composite home input and child care both
tend to range from 0.2 to 0.5, implying a moderate degree of complementarity. Most specifications suggest
that child’s age raises the productivity of household goods inputs relative to both child care services and
maternal time inputs. Perhaps surprisingly, we find no consistent patterns for the effects of parental post-
secondary schooling on the relative productivity of parental time or home goods inputs. Finally, we note
that the similarity of our estimates, regardless of whether or how we account for unobserved heterogeneity,
suggests that unmeasured differences across parents have little impact on the relative productivity of
different investment inputs. We also find little evidence to suggest that measurement error in wages
confounds our estimation approaches that abstract from it.
6.2 GMM Estimation Based on Relative Demand and the Dynamics of Achievement
To estimate the full model, including both f(·) and H(·), we combine moments for the individual
input ratios in 1997 (t = 0) and 2002 (t = 5), described in Equation (36), as well as moments for child
achievement scores, defined in Equation (41), using measured household prices for all years 1997–2001.50
To calculate the moments involving test scores, we only include observations for children ages 3–8 in
1997, whose mothers are observed working in each year 1997–2001.51 The full vector of moments takes
all available comparisons for input shares across years, as well as outcome equations for both Letter-Word
and Applied Problems scores using both mother’s time and father’s time (when available) as proxies for
investment.
Table 14 summarizes the input ratios used. With complete data, some of these ratios would be implied
by combinations of the others; however, there are a substantial number of cases in which only some of the
inputs are measured, so using additional combinations exploits the available information.
Instruments for Input Ratios Consider the moment condition on the ratio of input x1 to input x2.
The vector of instruments ZΦ,x1,x2,i,t contains the full set of observables that are permitted to affect either
ax1 or ax2 , in addition to the relative price of input x1 to input x2. For example, for the input ratio Yc/τm,
this relative price ratio would be Pc,i,t/Wm,i,t. We evaluate these ratios separately by marital status and,
hence, exclude the marital status indicator from the set of instruments.
50We also include the moments for achievement measurements given in Equation (42).
51We continue to restrict samples to those whose parents have a high predicted probability of work when moments include
parental time; however, the main conclusions are unchanged when this restriction is dropped.
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Instruments for Outcome Equations The vector of instruments used for the Applied Problems
score, ZAP,i, includes all observables that are permitted to affect θi, the pair (ln(τ
o
m,i,5), ln(τ
o
f,i,5)), which
instrument for time investment in 1997, and the Letter-Word score in 1997, LWi,0, which instruments for
the noisy measure of skills, APi,0, in the outcome equation. Construction of ZLW,i is identical, except
that APi,0 now instruments for LWi,0 in the outcome equation. This strategy allows us to account for
measurement error in inputs and in the current stock of child human capital.
Missing Data We interact each moment with a binary variable that indicates when there is sufficient
data to evaluate the moment. This does not affect the validity of the moment conditions as long as data
is not missing in a way that systematically varies with the vector of measurement errors.
6.2.1 Results
Table 15 reports the estimates from the GMM procedure using all observations of relative demand
reported in Table 14, in addition to the moment conditions for achievement scores. For comparison,
estimates are also provided for the case in which only the moments for relative demand are used. Increases
in precision for these estimates are largely achieved from a combination of (i) additional observations
coming from 1997 incorporated with the use of Yc/τm input ratios and (ii) cross-equation restrictions on
elasticities and factor shares, which appear in all moment equations.
Most parameter estimates are quite similar, regardless of our assumptions on borrowing constraints,
although the estimated effects of total investment on skill accumulation as determined by δ1 is greater
(0.11 vs. 0.05) in the case of no borrowing/saving. Because our achievement scores are normalized to
have standard deviation of 1, δ1 can be interpreted as the fraction of a standard deviation increase in
Letter-Word scores resulting from a log point increase in investment.52 Estimates of δ2 are both about
0.95 and suggest strong persistence in skills (i.e., self-productivity) over ages 5–12.
Estimates of ρ and γ imply similar degrees of complementarity to estimates reported earlier; however,
they are generally more precise. Estimates of ρ imply an elasticity of substitution between parental time
and home goods inputs of around 0.4 to 0.5, while estimates of γ imply slightly stronger complementarity
between the home composite input and child care services with an elasticity of around 0.3.
Finally, we highlight several points regarding the estimated share parameters (φm, φf , φg).
53 First,
52Because we estimate a factor loading on Applied Problems (λAP ) around 1.2, the fraction of a standard deviation increase
in AP scores is 1.2× δ1.
53Appendix Table D-9 reports estimates of λAP and φ̃θ for marital status, parental education, and child’s age. Estimated φ̃θ
imply greater skill growth among children in two-parent households, but relatively modest differences by parental education.
There is some indication that older children have greater skill growth, where the difference is significant for the estimates
assuming families are not borrowing constrained. While these differences are important for the accumulation of human
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our estimates suggest similar relative productivity of parental time and goods investments for married
vs. single parents. Second, we observe little systematic relationship between parental education and the
productivity of parental time or home goods inputs, although there is some indication that the relative
productivity of father’s time is lower among those with some college education than those with either
more or less education. Third, older children have a lower relative productivity of maternal time and
higher relative productivity of home goods inputs. Fourth, more young children in the household reduce
the relative productivity of parental time (especially for mothers) and goods inputs.
7 Counterfactual Analysis: Explaining Investment Behavior
In this section, we use our model and the GMM estimates for the case of no borrowing/saving (re-
ported in column (1) of Table 15) to study key factors driving family investment decisions. In particular,
we investigate the sources of investment gaps across families and the role of technology in determining
investment responses to price changes.54
7.1 Variation in Investment
It is common in the recent literature on the dynamics of skill accumulation to assume a single price
of “investment”; however, wages vary considerably across families and, as we demonstrate, parental time
inputs are a major form of investment. This suggests that the actual price of composite investment may
vary considerably across families. We explore this issue by first investigating the extent to which variation
in investment expenditures, Et = p̄tXt, derives from variation in the choice of investment quantity Xt vs.
variation in composite input prices faced by families, p̄t. Using our estimated technology and input prices
to construct p̄t for each child in the 2002 PSID, Table 16 shows that while the variance of log expenditures
is higher for single-parent households (0.70 vs. 0.57), the variance in log composite prices is also higher.
For both single mothers and two-parent households, 48% of the variance of log investment expenditures
is explained by the variance of log composite prices.
We next explore the sources of this price variation. The composite price of investment is a function of
input prices and parameters of the per-period investment technology (see Equation 9), with share param-
eters of that technology (am, af , ag) all depending on parental education and other family characteristics.
Thus, variance in the composite price arises from differences in input prices and differences in these family
characteristics. Table 17 decomposes this price into different sources by computing counterfactual com-
capital, they play no role in investment behavior as discussed in Section 3.2.
54In these counterfactual exercises, we exclude families with zero child care expenditures from 2002 PSID, because they
are not used for estimation when we rely on log expenditure ratios.
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posite prices under different equalization scenarios for input prices.55 When all prices are equalized in the
last column, the remaining variation is due to differences in technology (i.e., share parameters). It is clear
from the table that variation in parental wages is the most important source of variation in the composite
price of investment, especially for single mothers, while variation in the price of goods and market child
care play little role. Variation in the productivity of investments across families accounts for about 40% of
the price variation for two-parent households and less than one-quarter of the variation for single-parent
households.
As documented in Section 2, more-educated parents spend much more on investments in their children
than less-educated parents. We next explore the extent to which these gaps are driven by systematic
differences in preferences for child skills, parental wages, and the productivity of investments. This exercise
requires us to calibrate preference parameters (α,ψm, ψf ), which we allow to vary by parental education
in order to fit average maternal time investment levels and parental hours worked depending on whether
mothers had attended college or not. (See Appendix C for details.) We note that preference parameters
only affect the levels of investments, not relative input shares or the composite price of investment.
Because more-educated parents earn higher wages, on average, they face higher investment prices but also
have more available household resources. As such, differences in parental wages have competing effects
on investment. Lastly, productivity differences in am, af , and ag arising from differences in parental
human capital affect the price and quantity of investment, but these effects are offsetting such that total
expenditures are invariant to these differences (see Equation (21)).
The first column of Table 18 shows total investment expenditures, prices, and quantities for families
with college-educated mothers, relative to those with non-college mothers, as implied by the model.
College-educated single mothers spend 58% more on child investments compared to their non-college-
educated counterparts. The discrepancy is even greater (87%) for two-parent households. For two-parent
households, the difference in expenditures is almost entirely driven by the higher prices they face (due
to higher wages). For single mothers, differences in investment quantities also account for some of the
expenditure difference. The second column presents these same gaps when preference parameters for
college-educated mothers are equalized to those for non-college mothers. While this has no impact on prices
(as mentioned above), it reduces investment expenditure gaps by substantially narrowing differences in
investment quantities.56 For single mothers, the gap in quantities is reduced by about 21 percentage points,
55When equalizing wages, we set wages for all parents to the average wage conditional on gender and marital status. When
we equalize goods and market child care prices, we set them equal to the unconditional average prices for all families.
56In practice, preferences for child skills, α, and for leisure, ψm and ψf , are calibrated to explain gaps in average investment
levels and hours worked once all other sources of variation in the model (i.e., input prices and technology parameters) have
been taken into account. Table 18 simply decomposes these gaps in a different order from that used in calibrating these
parameters.
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while for two-parent households the gap is removed entirely. The next column shows that accounting for
parental wage differences eliminates nearly all of the price gaps and some of the remaining investment
quantity gaps (after already accounting for differences in preferences). The impacts on investment quantity
gaps show that the additional family income associated with higher wages dominates the effects of higher
investment prices when it comes to investments in children. (This is also the case for single mother’s time
investments, which are also shown in the table.) The final column also equalizes other input prices, which
has little additional effect on prices or quantities. All remaining differences are quite modest, consistent
with our finding that estimated technology share parameters are not systematically related to parental
education. Altogether, Table 18 shows that sizeable investment expenditure gaps by parental education
are largely driven by differences in the price of investment, which are, in turn, driven by the higher wage
rates faced by more-educated parents; however, more educated parents also appear to have a stronger
preference for child skills than less-educated parents, which accounts for some of the expenditure gaps
(more so for single mothers).
7.2 Price Changes
Because many policies designed to encourage investments in children (e.g., child care subsidies, publicly
provided goods like libraries and community activities), as well as many tax and welfare policies, primarily
influence family investment decisions through changes in input prices (or their shadow prices), we next
consider the impacts of reducing these prices. In doing so, we consider changes in prices when children
are ages 5–12, the ages covered by most children in our sample. Using our estimates for the case of no
borrowing/saving, we simulate effects on behavior under that same assumption.
Tables 19 and 20 report the effects of separately reducing each input price by 10%. Start by focusing
on the first three columns, which report results for our estimated nested CES production function. Due
to the complementarity we estimate, a change in the price of any input causes all inputs to adjust in the
same direction as seen in Panel A. Except for changes in the price of parental time (i.e., wages), cross-price
elasticities are substantially weaker than own-price elasticities, but not negligible. For example, a 10%
reduction in the price of child care leads to a 4–5% increase in child care inputs and a 0.5–1.1% increase
in parental time and home goods inputs. The effects of a decline in wages are notably different, because
this not only lowers the price of investment but also directly impacts family income. Proposition 4 tells us
investment expenditures must decline with the reduction in family resources, but we see an even stronger
result in that the levels of investment decline. Even parental time investments decline slightly due to the
complementarity of inputs.
In Panel B of Tables 19 and 20, we calculate the effects of input price changes on child achievement
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measured at age 13. The first row reports changes in scaled log achievement, which is equivalent to per-
centages of a standard deviation in Letter-Word scores (LWi,t). The second row reports the consumption
equivalent value of the changes in achievement, measured as the percent increase in consumption over
ages 5–12 that would make a family indifferent to the change in achievement. Due to well-known issues
regarding interpretability of test score scales (Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach, 2010), this consumption
equivalent measure is our preferred method of interpreting changes in child outcomes. We see that declines
in investment associated with a 10% reduction in wages would lead to a reduction in achievement at age
13 of 1.6% of a standard deviation, which is valued at nearly 2% of consumption over ages 5–12 for the
children of single mothers. A 10% reduction in the price of child care would raise achievement at age 13 by
an amount valued at about 1.2% of ages 5–12 consumption (for children of single mothers), while a 10%
reduction in the price of home goods inputs would raise achievement by 40% less. The impacts of price
changes on log achievement are notably smaller for children from two-parent households. For example, a
10% reduction in wages for two-parent households produces a decline in child achievement equivalent to
0.6% of consumption, just over a quarter of the effect for single-mother households.
Panel C in Tables 19 and 20 reports the welfare implications of price changes in monetary terms. In
particular, we show the present value of welfare changes from price reductions over ages 5–12 discounted
back to age 5. We first report the average welfare gain (i.e., equivalent variation, EV), which suggests
gains of more than $2,000 for a 10% reduction in child care costs and gains of $1,350–1,521 for a 10%
reduction in the price of home investment goods and services. Not surprisingly, a 10% reduction in wages
would substantially lower family welfare due to income losses. Perhaps more interesting, we also report on
the distortionary effects of the price changes on behavior (implicitly assuming current prices are socially
optimal), netting out the standard income effects of price changes (as well as direct effects on income in
the case of wage reductions). Intuitively, we measure distortions as the amount families are willing to pay
in order to eliminate the price distortion and instead receive a lump-sum monetary transfer equal to any
changes in their budget.57 A convenient property of this welfare measure is that it enables a decomposition
into the distortion caused by input misallocation (i.e., relative investment effects) and distortions in the
total level of investment, consumption, and leisure. Given the complementarity of inputs, we observe small
distortions (resulting in willingness to pay measures of at most $67) due to misallocation of resources across
different inputs. However, the total distortions associated with wage reductions are sizeable, amounting
to over $2,000 for two-parent households. Total welfare distortions due to changes in the prices of other
inputs are quite small, largely because they represent a small share of family investment.
57The hypothetical lump-sum transfer is based on choices under the new prices. Our distortion measure equivalently
represents the welfare change for families if given the lump-sum transfer less the standard EV measure of welfare changes.
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To better understand the extent to which complementarity of inputs plays in the response to policies,
the last three columns of Tables 19 and 20 report results from the same set of price changes using a
Cobb-Douglas production function instead of our nested CES. For comparability, the share parameters
of the Cobb-Douglas function are calibrated to generate the same expenditure shares as our estimated
specification. Looking at Panel A, we observe dramatic differences in the incidence of price changes on
different inputs. With changes in home goods or child care prices, there are no cross-price effects, and
input quantities adjust one-for-one with price changes to maintain constant expenditure shares and total
expenditure levels. Wage reductions lead to one-for-one reductions in total expenditures due to the income
reduction with no adjustments in the amount of parental time invested. Yet, if one is only interested in
the effects on total investment Xt (and, consequently, skill growth as reported in Panel B), the Cobb-
Douglas specification produces very similar results to our nested CES specification. Looking at Panel C,
we see that the Cobb-Douglas case overstates the distortions due to misallocation of inputs (by factors of
2–4). Intuitively, the stronger complementarity implied by our estimates makes it optimal for families to
maintain a similar bundle of inputs regardless of the relative prices. This is not without cost, however.
As is evident from the EV welfare measure, the total welfare benefits from reductions in the price of home
goods inputs or child care services are smaller under the complementarity we estimate than the standard
Cobb-Douglas case would suggest.
The similar effects of price changes on total investment for very different input substitutability is
an artefact of our analysis of small price changes. Indeed, as shown in Appendix A.5, the impacts of
marginal changes in input prices on total investment depend on expenditure shares but not elasticities of
substitution. This is not the case for larger price changes. Appendix Table D-10 shows that the Cobb-
Douglas specification overpredicts total investment responses by about 20% for larger (i.e., 50%) reductions
in the price of home goods or child care services, while it underpredicts (by 13–18%) the decline in total
investment associated with a 50% wage decline. Together, these results imply that if one is interested in
the investment response to small price changes, it is possible to rely only on expenditure shares, without
taking a stand on technology; however, the complementarity of investments must be accounted for when
studying the effects of larger price changes. A second lesson can be garnered from Appendix Table D-10.
For both the nested CES and Cobb-Douglas cases, the price elasticities of total investment are stronger
for larger price changes, suggesting that one cannot simply “scale up” the impacts estimated from small
price changes to obtain accurate predictions about larger price changes. For larger price changes, it is
essential to compute the elasticity of such a change directly based on estimates of the full technology.
These lessons provide a cautionary tale for research approaches looking to assemble global policy analysis
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from local elasticities.
8 Conclusions
Parents spend considerable sums investing in their children in terms of their time, purchased home
goods/services inputs, and purchased market child care services. Of these different types of investments,
parental time is the most costly investment made by the majority of parents.
We document a strong increase in total investment expenditures with maternal education in the PSID-
CDS, ATUS, and CEX. Despite this strong increase, we find that the allocation of expenditures across
different investment inputs — parental time, household goods and services, and purchased market child
care — changes little with parental schooling. To understand these patterns and to study the impacts of
policies that act on input prices, we develop a dynamic model of investments in children with multiple
inputs each period, flexibility in substitution patterns across those inputs, and several channels through
which parental skills may affect the productivity of those inputs. We analytically characterize investment
behavior, showing how the substitutability of different inputs determines the qualitative responses to
input price changes. We also show how the relationship between parental skills and investments in children
depends on both the substitutability of inputs and the extent to which parental skills raise the productivity
of both parental time and home goods inputs.
We then develop an estimation strategy based on intratemporal optimality alone to identify elasticities
of substitution across inputs and the impacts of parental skills on the productivity of home investment
inputs. This relative demand estimation approach not only avoids assumptions about preferences, credit
markets, and the dynamics of skill production, but also enables us to address unobserved heterogeneity
in parental skills and measurement error in all investment inputs and wages. In order to estimate the
full technology of skill production, including parameters governing the dynamics of skill accumulation, we
incorporate intertemporal moments based on noisy measures of child skills, addressing the fact that our
data do not contain measures of skills or inputs in consecutive years.
Exploiting PSID-CDS data, along with novel measures of child care prices from Child Care Aware of
America (2009–2019), we find robust evidence across empirical strategies that parental time and purchased
goods inputs are complements inside the home, while home investments are also complementary with
market child care services. In both cases, elasticities of substitution range from 0.2 to 0.5, which suggests
that the relatively constant expenditure shares across parental education are not the consequence of a
Cobb-Douglas technology. Instead, the patterns of complementarity and relative input productivity imply
a rough balance in the process of skill production such that parental human capital does not strongly favor
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one type of investment over others. Among other demographic factors that affect child development, we
find that the presence of more young children in the household reduces the productivity of both parental
time and goods inputs relative to market child care, while maternal time becomes relatively less productive
and home goods inputs relatively more productive for older children.
Our analysis suggests that there is considerable investment price variation across families, driven
primarily by differences in parental wages. This variation directly accounts for about half of all variation
in total investment expenditures across families. Unlike other prices, wages play two competing roles
within the family, determining the price of time investment as well as available family resources. The
extent of complementarity we estimate suggests that the latter role slightly dominates, so an increase in
parental wages leads to an increase in all forms of investment, including small increases in parental time
despite its higher opportunity cost. Because we estimate little systematic effect of parental education
on the productivity of home investments, the positive parental education gradient for time spent with
children and expenditures on child investments is driven by overall demand for investments (partly from
greater family resources and partly from stronger preferences for child skills) and not factor augmentation.
Our analysis of price change effects on constrained households sheds light on the likely impacts of a
wide array of policies that distort incentives to invest in various forms, from welfare and tax policies to
child care subsidies. Perhaps the most important lesson from this analysis is that the estimated patterns
of complementarity for investment inputs implies that all inputs move together with any price change,
although cross-price elasticities are generally modest except for wage changes, which substantially impact
investments due to changes in family resources. For small price changes, own-price elasticities for home
goods inputs and child care services are roughly -0.5, while the cross-price elasticities for these inputs
range from -0.02 to -0.10. Our estimates suggest modest distortionary impacts of changes in relative input
prices on the allocation of inputs conditional on a given level of total investment; however, total welfare
distortions from changes in wages are sizeable due to changes in the level of total investment, leisure,
and consumption allocations. We also measure the impacts of price changes (over child ages 5–12) on
child skill levels at age 13. Due to enhanced family resources, we find that policies which raise parental
wage rates would lead to sizeable positive impacts on child achievement, consistent with studies that
estimate positive effects of EITC expansions on child achievement (Dahl and Lochner, 2012; Agostinelli
and Sorrenti, 2018). A 10% subsidy for child care would lead to sizeable improvements in the skills of
children with single mothers valued at about 1.2% of consumption over child ages 5–12, while a 10%
subsidy for home goods/services inputs would produce only about two-thirds that benefit. Across all
policies, the achievement impacts are smaller for children in two-parent households.
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To evaluate the importance of accounting for general patterns of substitution across inputs, we conduct
a similar policy analysis assuming a Cobb-Douglas within-period production function calibrated to fit
the same expenditure shares as we obtain with our estimates. Comparing the predictions from our
more general nested CES function (with elasticities of substitution of roughly 1/2 and 1/3) with the
Cobb-Douglas function (with elasticities of 1) is revealing. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Cobb-Douglas
specification produces results that are highly misleading in terms of specific input responses to relative
price changes. However, many researchers may be primarily interested in quantifying the effects of policy
on total investments and child achievement, regardless of effects on specific child inputs. In this case, our
conclusions are nuanced. For small price changes, only input expenditure shares are needed to accurately
predict total investment and skill accumulation, so the Cobb-Douglas specification performs well. This
is not the case for larger price changes. When price changes are larger, the substitutability of inputs
becomes important and our nested CES production function predicts substantially different responses
to those obtained from the comparable Cobb-Douglas case. An additional lesson can be gleaned from
our comparison of small vs. large price changes: “scaling up” effects on investment estimated from small
price changes is inappropriate. With complementary inputs, price elasticities for total investment are
substantially stronger for large price changes.
This paper has aimed to clarify several key issues and challenges that arise when attempting to under-
stand the complex set of decisions parents must make regarding how and when to invest in their children.
A key limitation of this, as well as other papers in this literature, is the dearth of rich data. The PSID-
CDS may be the only single data set with available measures of all three types of inputs we consider,
repeated measures of achievement, and other key family measures. Yet, the useable sample sizes are frus-
tratingly small, and both achievement and investment inputs are infrequently measured. Future research
in this area should endeavor to make better use of multiple data sets that may specialize in subsets of
needed measures but which contain much larger samples, richer measures of specific inputs or outcomes,
and which share rough sampling frames and important family characteristics like household composition,
parental wages, family income, and labor supply (e.g., ATUS and CEX). Another path forward would
be to combine the results from several natural or actual experiments, connecting marginal policy effects
to primitive parameters of the child production function and/or preferences. Chaparro, Sojourner, and
Wiswall (2020) and Mullins (2020) take productive steps in this direction. Richer data may also enable
researchers to combine the relative demand approach we take with very flexible production function esti-
mation using data on both inputs and outcomes (e.g., Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach, 2010; Agostinelli
and Wiswall, 2016, 2020) to learn more about parental beliefs about vs. actual relative productivity of
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different inputs.58
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Table 1: Weekly Child Investment Expenditures by Mother’s Education (PSID, 2002)
Mother’s Education
Expenditure Amount All HS dropout HS graduate Some College College+
A. Single Mothers
Mother’s time 217.97 126.07 161.20 227.39 362.80
(13.45) (17.99) (15.00) (20.38) (47.94)
271 26 99 97 49
HH goods 12.71 7.72 11.30 13.63 17.71
(0.78) (1.22) (1.20) (1.29) (2.54)
356 40 139 120 57
Child care 8.99 2.16 5.90 12.45 14.36
(2.47) (1.24) (1.42) (7.02) (3.26)
389 44 154 130 61
Total 249.25 136.80 181.73 262.42 417.75
(15.30) (19.15) (16.57) (23.02) (54.66)
253 25 89 94 45
B. Two-Parent Households
Mother’s time 285.79 134.12 228.89 273.51 364.18
(10.34) (25.65) (14.83) (17.86) (19.68)
518 26 144 167 181
Father’s time 294.67 121.75 219.73 255.94 417.71
(14.75) (27.06) (21.50) (22.57) (30.57)
612 38 174 183 217
Total parental time 572.43 290.90 457.09 513.67 749.83
(21.39) (58.83) (35.28) (30.88) (41.15)
480 23 133 151 173
HH goods 19.77 9.70 15.96 18.93 25.54
(0.75) (2.01) (1.16) (1.47) (1.34)
685 41 205 203 236
Child care 10.98 6.44 4.57 9.93 18.37
(2.98) (3.05) (1.05) (1.63) (8.65)
730 45 215 224 246
Total 608.18 298.13 482.53 544.25 797.43
(23.12) (64.02) (36.38) (33.07) (44.84)
456 21 129 139 167
Notes: Samples restricted to children ages 0–12 from families with only 1 or 2 children ages 0–12, parents
ages 18–65, mothers ages 16–45 when youngest child was born. Table reports means (std. errors) and
number of obs. Expenditures in 2002 dollars.
Table 2: Child Investment Expenditure Shares by Mother’s Education (PSID, 2002)
Mother’s Education
Expenditure Shares All HS dropout HS graduate Some College College+
A. Single Mothers
Mother’s time 0.81 0.88 0.79 0.78 0.86
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
HH goods 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.11
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Child care 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Sample size 253 25 89 94 45
B. Two-Parent Households
Mother’s time 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.52 0.50
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Father’s time 0.41 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.42
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Total parental time 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
HH goods 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Child care 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Sample size 456 21 129 139 167
Notes: Samples restricted to children ages 0–12 from families with only 1 or 2 children ages 0–12, parents
ages 18–65, mothers ages 16–45 when youngest child was born. Table reports means (std. errors).
Table 3: Weekly Hours of Child Investment Time by Mother’s Education (PSID, 2002)
Time with Children Mother’s Education
(hours) All HS dropout HS graduate Some College College+
A. Single Mothers
Mother’s time 17.79 18.47 16.02 17.79 21.63
(0.66) (2.06) (1.05) (1.14) (1.51)
Sample size 347 38 135 118 56
B. Two-Parent Households
Mother’s time 19.57 15.38 20.77 18.63 20.18
(0.43) (1.72) (0.88) (0.69) (0.73)
Father’s time 13.00 11.41 12.19 12.57 14.33
(0.43) (1.65) (0.80) (0.78) (0.75)
Total parental time 32.57 26.79 32.96 31.20 34.50
(0.74) (2.69) (1.46) (1.24) (1.30)
Sample size 664 42 190 202 230
Notes: Samples restricted to children ages 0–12 from families with only 1 or 2 children ages 0–12, parents
ages 18–65, mothers ages 16–45 when youngest child was born. Table reports means (std. errors).
Table 4: Weekly Child Investment Expenditures by Mother’s Education (2003–18 ATUS & CEX)
Mother’s Education
Expenditure Amount All HS dropout HS graduate Some College College+
A. Single Mothers
Mother’s time 65.69 27.23 46.04 61.13 128.93
(2.21) (3.15) (2.68) (2.82) (7.38)
4,309 321 1,197 1,655 1,136
HH goods 10.20 4.50 5.67 9.69 18.71
(0.48) (0.55) (0.52) (0.90) (1.16)
1,152 147 315 410 280
Child care 19.98 7.99 11.67 16.87 39.47
(1.19) (1.73) (1.55) (1.37) (3.74)
1,152 147 315 410 280
Total Avg. Expenditures 95.87 39.71 63.39 87.68 187.10
B. Two-Parent Households
Mother’s time 131.68 37.40 72.38 89.98 181.55
(2.71) (6.48) (4.36) (3.66) (4.35)
6,959 217 1,018 1,836 3,888
Father’s time 127.13 40.53 81.78 94.58 165.42
(3.14) (7.79) (5.89) (4.70) (4.93)
6,026 167 918 1,590 3,351
HH goods 20.46 6.59 12.43 17.51 27.68
(0.34) (0.56) (0.47) (0.52) (0.59)
6,663 508 1,200 1,866 3,089
Child care 33.60 5.59 12.65 23.39 52.63
(0.85) (0.76) (0.85) (1.23) (1.56)
6,663 508 1,200 1,866 3,089
Total Avg. Expenditures 312.88 90.11 179.24 225.46 427.28
Notes: Samples restricted to families with only 1 or 2 children ages 0–12, parents ages 18–65, mothers ages
16–45 when youngest child was born. Table reports means (std. errors) and number of obs. Expenditures
in 2002 dollars.
Table 5: Summary of PSID-CDS Variables
Model Variable Name Measurement Details Years Number child-year observations
Wm,it,Wf,it Mother’s and father’s wages
Earnings/hours from PSID Main
Interview
1985–2002 21,892 & 17,148
Pc,itYc,it Expenditures on child care
PCG interview from CDS, with
supplement from Main Interview
1997–2002 800
τm,it,τf,it
Mother’s and father’s time
investment
Sum of active time from CDS time
diaries
1997, 2002 1,586 & 1,167
pi,tgi,t
Household expenditure on
market goods
PCG interview from CDS 2002 709
Ψi,t Child human capital
Letter-Word and Applied Problems
scores from CDS
1997, 2002 470 & 467
Zi,t
Mother’s and father’s educa-
tion, race, household compo-
sition, mother’s marital sta-
tus, child’s age
PSID Main Interviews, childbirth
file
1997–2002 8,148
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics (1997 & 2002 PSID-CDS)
Num. Obs. Mean Std. Deviation
Mother’s wage (Wm) 2,349 12.60 8.10
Father’s wage (Wf ) 1,905 20.14 14.59
Child’s age 3,469 7.17 3.43
Mother complete high school 3,469 0.34 0.47
Mother some college 3,469 0.32 0.46
Mother college+ 3,469 0.25 0.43
Mother’s age 3,469 34.48 7.04
Father complete high school 2,319 0.38 0.49
Father some college 2,319 0.22 0.41
Father college+ 2,319 0.30 0.46
Father’s age 2,311 37.61 7.44
Mother white 3,431 0.57 0.50
Num. children ages 0–5 in household 3,469 0.56 0.69
Num. children in household 3,469 1.99 0.73
Notes: Samples from 1997 and 2002 PSID CDS include children ages 0–12 from families with no
more than 2 children ages 0–12.
Table 7: OLS estimates for mother time/goods relative demand (all mothers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(W̃m,i) 0.467
∗ 0.530∗ 0.558∗ 0.567∗ 0.758∗
(0.078) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.098)
Married -0.276∗ -0.256∗ -0.183 -0.173 -0.176
(0.095) (0.096) (0.104) (0.104) (0.103)
Child’s age -0.084∗ -0.093∗ -0.096∗ -0.115∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Mother HS grad. 1.598∗ 1.649∗
(0.773) (0.771)
Mother some coll. 1.495 1.534∗ -0.101
(0.774) (0.772) (0.108)
Mother coll+ 1.389 1.460 -0.185
(0.779) (0.778) (0.119)
Mother’s age -0.010 -0.011 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Mother white -0.209∗ -0.201∗ -0.216∗
(0.099) (0.099) (0.097)
Num. children -0.046 -0.037 0.061
ages 0–5 in HH (0.120) (0.121) (0.116)
Num. children 0.133 0.134 0.120
in HH (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Mother’s log wage -0.425∗
fixed effect (0.101)
Constant 1.753∗ 1.247 1.048 2.633∗ 1.934∗
(0.206) (0.819) (0.831) (0.378) (0.336)
Implied ρ -0.877 -1.129 -1.262 -1.312 -3.132
(0.275) (0.376) (0.428) (0.447) (1.676)
R-squared 0.062 0.104 0.116 0.109 0.126
N 628 628 628 628 618
Notes: Sample from 2002 PSID CDS includes children ages 0–12 from families with
no more than 2 children ages 0–12. Sample is limited to all mothers with predicted
probability of work at least 0.7. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ statistically sig.
at 0.05 level.
Table 8: IV estimates (instruments: state dummies) for mother’s time/goods relative demand (all mothers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(W̃m,i) 0.386 0.667
∗ 0.779∗ 0.778∗ 0.752∗
(0.222) (0.256) (0.262) (0.263) (0.258)
Married -0.266∗ -0.258∗ -0.187 -0.177 -0.175
(0.098) (0.095) (0.104) (0.104) (0.102)
Child’s age -0.083∗ -0.093∗ -0.095∗ -0.115∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Mother HS grad. 1.530∗ 1.542∗
(0.779) (0.778)
Mother some coll. 1.394 1.374 -0.152
(0.791) (0.790) (0.124)
Mother coll+ 1.258 1.252 -0.281
(0.810) (0.810) (0.164)
Mother’s age -0.012 -0.014 -0.013
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Mother white -0.216∗ -0.208∗ -0.216∗
(0.099) (0.099) (0.097)
Num. children -0.051 -0.042 0.060
ages 0–5 in HH (0.120) (0.120) (0.120)
Num. children 0.159∗ 0.158∗ 0.119
in HH (0.074) (0.074) (0.069)
Mother’s log wage -0.422∗
fixed effect (0.183)
Constant 1.953∗∗∗ 1.056 0.709 2.210∗ 1.947∗
(0.550) (0.884) (0.912) (0.627) (0.642)
Implied ρ -0.628 -1.999 -3.517 -3.499 -3.036
(0.590) (2.302) (5.340) (5.317) (4.205)
N 628 628 628 628 618
Notes: Sample from 2002 PSID CDS includes children ages 0–12 from families with
no more than 2 children ages 0–12. Sample is limited to all mothers with predicted
probability of work at least 0.7. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ statistically
sig. at 0.05 level.
Table 9: Estimates for parental time vs. goods relative demand
OLS Instrumental Variables
All Single Married Married All Single Married Married
Mothers Mothers Mothers Fathers Mothers Mothers Mothers Fathers
ln(W̃j,i) 0.567
∗ 0.514∗ 0.588∗ 0.683∗ 0.778∗ 0.872∗ 0.556 0.129
(0.084) (0.173) (0.094) (0.101) (0.263) (0.298) (0.284) (0.350)
Married -0.173 -0.177
(0.104) (0.104)
Child’s age -0.096∗ -0.087 -0.109∗ -0.054 -0.095∗ -0.083 -0.109∗ -0.051
(0.024) (0.048) (0.028) (0.030) (0.024) (0.047) (0.028) (0.031)
Parent some -0.101 0.125 -0.255∗ -0.147 -0.152 0.033 -0.248 -0.011
college (0.108) (0.195) (0.130) (0.145) (0.124) (0.202) (0.143) (0.170)
Parent coll+ -0.185 0.160 -0.383∗∗ -0.044 -0.281 0.006 -0.369∗ 0.251
(0.119) (0.241) (0.137) (0.142) (0.164) (0.260) (0.183) (0.230)
Parent’s age -0.010 -0.022 -0.001 -0.018∗ -0.013 -0.024 -0.001 -0.012
(0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010)
Mother white -0.201∗ -0.316 -0.167 -0.076 -0.208∗ -0.346 -0.167 0.007
(0.099) (0.192) (0.115) (0.134) (0.099) (0.191) (0.114) (0.145)
Num. children -0.037 -0.494∗ 0.169 0.199 -0.042 -0.480∗ 0.171 0.196
ages 0–5 in HH (0.121) (0.246) (0.137) (0.139) (0.120) (0.243) (0.136) (0.142)
Num. children 0.134 0.102 0.170∗ 0.131 0.158∗ 0.125 0.166 0.118
in HH (0.068) (0.123) (0.083) (0.091) (0.074) (0.123) (0.091) (0.093)
Constant 2.633∗ 3.145∗ 2.189∗ 1.656∗ 2.210∗ 2.337∗ 2.250∗ 2.844∗
(0.378) (0.759) (0.445) (0.475) (0.627) (0.929) (0.682) (0.866)
Implied ρ -1.312 -1.058 -1.425 -2.151 -3.499 -6.809 -1.252 -0.148
(0.447) (0.734) (0.554) (0.999) (5.317) (18.142) (1.439) (0.461)
R-squared 0.109 0.098 0.132 0.121
N 628 197 431 486 628 197 431 486
Notes: Sample from 2002 PSID CDS includes children ages 0–12 from families with no more than 2 children ages 0–12.
Samples examining mother’s (father’s) time are limited to those with predicted probability of work at least 0.7 (0.85).
Specifications for mothers (fathers) include mother’s (father’s) log relative wage, education indicators, and age.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ statistically sig. at 0.05 level.
Table 10: OLS estimates for child care/goods relative demand (single mothers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(P̃c,i) 0.439 0.449 0.214 0.150 0.165
(0.380) (0.402) (0.402) (0.384) (0.399)
Child’s age -0.196∗ -0.174∗ -0.135 -0.178∗
(0.073) (0.069) (0.073) (0.088)
Mother some coll. 0.158 0.014 0.175
(0.309) (0.326) (0.323)
Mother coll+ -0.239 -0.406 -0.258
(0.336) (0.338) (0.415)
Mother’s age 0.005 0.015 0.008
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
Mother white -0.452 -0.503 -0.473 -0.404
(0.293) (0.282) (0.280) (0.317)
Num. children -0.247 -0.515 0.073 -0.087
ages 0–5 in HH (0.338) (0.318) (0.329) (0.456)
Num. children 0.030 0.096 0.124 0.071
in HH (0.211) (0.204) (0.194) (0.207)
Mother’s log wage 0.206
fixed effect (0.246)
ln(1 +Rm,i) 0.550
∗
(0.138)
ln
(
1 + eΦ̃m,i
)
0.228
(0.627)
Constant 0.236 1.891∗ 2.032∗ -0.477 1.133
(0.363) (0.900) (0.798) (1.073) (2.703)
Implied γ -0.781 -0.815 -0.272 -0.177 -0.197
(1.206) (1.324) (0.650) (0.531) (0.572)
Implied ρ -0.500 -0.271
(1.903) (0.827)
R-squared 0.013 0.126 0.108 0.299 0.136
N 104 103 98 83 97
Notes: Sample from 2002 PSID CDS includes children ages 0–12 from families with
no more than 2 children ages 0–12. Sample is limited to single mothers with predicted
probability of work at least 0.7. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ statistically
sig. at 0.05 level.
Table 11: OLS estimates for child care/goods relative demand (two-parent households)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(P̃c,i) 0.478 0.637 0.540 0.521 0.603
(0.322) (0.330) (0.333) (0.361) (0.357)
Child’s age -0.151∗ -0.168∗ -0.119 -0.146∗
(0.054) (0.055) (0.063) (0.068)
Mother some coll. 0.079 0.210 0.080
(0.256) (0.290) (0.278)
Mother coll+ -0.329 0.010 -0.346
(0.265) (0.301) (0.283)
Mother’s age 0.004 -0.028 0.012
(0.028) (0.034) (0.031)
Father some coll. 0.248 0.194 0.257
(0.244) (0.274) (0.263)
Father coll+ -0.377 -0.621∗ -0.397
(0.239) (0.262) (0.271)
Father’s age -0.018 0.013 -0.021
(0.024) (0.028) (0.026)
Mother white -0.242 -0.347 -0.262 -0.203
(0.198) (0.213) (0.213) (0.218)
Num. children -0.110 0.090 -0.046 -0.065
ages 0–5 in HH (0.197) (0.202) (0.223) (0.246)
Num. children 0.028 0.038 0.124 0.042
in HH (0.185) (0.189) (0.205) (0.215)
Mother’s log wage -0.363
fixed effect (0.208)
Father’s log wage -0.103
fixed effect (0.214)
ln(1 +Rf,i +Rm,i) 0.583
∗
(0.114)
ln
(
1 + eΦ̃f,i + eΦ̃m,i
)
0.136
(0.492)
Constant 0.049 2.025∗ 1.648∗ -0.595 1.331
(0.332) (0.852) (0.702) (1.033) (2.116)
Implied γ -0.914 -1.757 -1.173 -1.090 -1.521
(1.179) (2.507) (1.572) (1.575) (2.272)
Implied ρ 4.997 -2.312
(15.107) (6.089)
R-squared 0.011 0.152 0.101 0.312 0.145
N 203 203 191 149 179
Notes: Samples from 2002 PSID CDS include children ages 0–12 from families with
no more than 2 children ages 0–12. Sample is limited to two-parent households with
predicted probability that both parents work at least 0.65. Standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ statistically sig. at 0.05 level.
Table 12: OLS estimates for time/goods and child care/goods relative demand accounting for measurement
error and independent unobserved heterogeneity
Single Two-Parent Households
Mothers Unrestricted Meas. Error Restricted Meas. Error
ln(P̃c,i) 0.231 0.677
∗ 0.687∗
(0.376) (0.319) (0.319)
Child’s age -0.074 -0.090 -0.088
(0.062) (0.053) (0.053)
Mother some coll. 0.288 0.299 0.256
(0.299) (0.258) (0.256)
Mother coll+ 0.280 0.335 0.311
(0.355) (0.267) (0.267)
Father some coll. 0.134 0.171
(0.238) (0.236)
Father coll+ -0.377 -0.374
(0.235) (0.236)
ln(1 +Rm,i) or 0.647 -0.064 -0.113
ln(1 +Rf,i +Rm,i) (0.399) (0.272) (0.270)
Constant -1.731 1.018 1.065
(1.671) (1.272) (1.274)
Implied γ -0.300 -2.097 -2.190
(0.635) (3.056) ( 3.248)
Implied ρ -1.893 -1.751 -1.608
(8.601) (2.440) (2.086)
R-squared 0.378 0.438 0.432
N 83 149 149
Notes: Samples from 2002 PSID CDS include children ages 0–12 from families with no more than 2
children ages 0–12. Sample for single mothers (two-parent households) is limited to those with
predicted probability that the mother (both parents) work at least 0.7 (0.65). Estimated coefficients
related to measurement error in Equations (31) and (35) not shown. Restricted measurement error
case assumes σ2Wmτm = σ
2
Wf τf
. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ statistically sig. at 0.05 level.
Table 13: GMM estimates for time/goods and child care/goods relative demand accounting for measure-
ment error and unobserved heterogeneity (two-parent households)
General Measurement Error Restricted Measurement Error
No Instruments Instruments: State No Instruments Instruments: State
γ -1.905∗ -1.827 -1.738∗ -1.461
(0.909) (1.812) (0.829) (1.292)
ρ -1.762∗ -1.428 -1.765∗ -1.481
(0.504) (1.325) (0.506) (1.299)
(φm − φg):
Constant 5.594∗ 2.985∗ 5.608∗ 3.009∗
(1.267) (1.306) (1.270) (1.321)
Child’s age -0.284∗ -0.204 -0.284∗ -0.209
(0.093) (0.139) (0.093) (0.138)
Mother some coll. -0.766 -0.543 -0.757 -0.561
(0.405) (0.599) (0.404) (0.598)
Mother coll+ -1.116∗ -0.992 -1.102∗ -1.024
(0.471) (0.894) (0.469) (0.883)
Mother’s age -0.003 0.035 -0.004 0.035
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Mother white -0.321 -0.170 -0.314 -0.174
(0.305) (0.293) (0.306) (0.298)
Num. children 0.600 0.865 0.595 0.882
ages 0–5 in HH (0.354) (0.511) (0.355) (0.509)
Num. children 0.394 0.435 0.398 0.447
in HH (0.261) (0.379) (0.261) (0.377)
(φf − φg):
Constant 5.039∗ 3.457∗ 4.992∗ 3.488∗
(1.320) (1.470) (1.318) (1.479)
Child’s age -0.128 -0.080 -0.128 -0.081
(0.089) (0.092) (0.089) (0.093)
Father some coll. -0.456 -0.344 -0.454 -0.356
(0.414) (0.495) (0.414) (0.499)
Father coll+ -0.047 -0.062 -0.040 -0.074
(0.402) (0.471) (0.402) (0.475)
Father’s age -0.052∗ -0.028 -0.051 -0.029
(0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.031)
Mother white -0.249 -0.083 -0.248 -0.089
(0.385) (0.351) (0.385) (0.357)
Num. children 0.503 0.622 0.499 0.636
ages 0–5 in HH (0.393) (0.470) (0.394) (0.472)
Num. children 0.263 0.312 0.265 0.318
in HH (0.246) (0.259) (0.246) (0.261)
φg:
Constant -2.446 -3.464 -1.766 -2.169
(1.570) (5.859) (1.550) (2.523)
Child’s age 0.249 0.204 0.261 0.258
(0.132) (0.184) (0.137) (0.160)
Mother some coll. -0.784 -0.834 -0.628 -0.572
(0.646) (0.732) (0.651) (0.720)
Mother coll+ -0.887 -0.831 -0.808 -0.691
(0.661) (0.651) (0.673) (0.772)
Father some coll. -0.387 -0.115 -0.549 -0.418
(0.598) (1.198) (0.600) (0.634)
Father coll+ 0.962 0.882 0.903 0.897
(0.724) (0.736) (0.745) (0.823)
Implied ετ,g 0.363 0.412 0.362 0.403
(0.066) (0.225) (0.066) (0.211)
Implied εY,g 0.344 0.354 0.365 0.406
(0.108) (0.227) (0.111) (0.213)
Objective Fun. 0.0006 0.0056 0.0012 0.0056
N 547 547 547 547
Notes: Samples from 2002 PSID CDS include children ages 0–12 from families with no more than 2 children ages 0–12.
Sample is limited to two-parent households with predicted probability that both parents work at least 0.65. Estimated
coefficients related to measurement error in Equation (35) not shown. Restricted measurement error cases assume
σ2Wmτm = σ
2
Wf τf
. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ statistically sig. at 0.05 level.
Table 14: Input Ratios used in Estimation
Marital Status Year Ratios
Married (Mi = 1) 1997 (t = 0)
Yc
τm
Married (Mi = 1) 2002 (t = 5)
Yc
τm
, τmg ,
Yc
g ,
τf
g
Single (Mi = 0) 1997 (t = 0)
Yc
τm
Single (Mi = 0) 2002 (t = 5)
Yc
τm
, τmg ,
Yc
g
Table 15: GMM estimates for full child production function
Includes Achievement Moments Without Achievement
No Borrowing/Saving Unconstrained Moments
δ1 0.11
∗ 0.05∗
(0.04) (0.02)
δ2 0.94
∗ 0.95∗
(0.02) (0.02)
γ -2.05∗ -2.13∗ -2.36∗
(0.94) (1.01) (1.18)
ρ -1.14∗ -1.39∗ -1.39∗
(0.30) (0.38) (0.40)
φm:
Married 1.90 2.43 2.30
(1.03) (1.29) (1.25)
Single 2.22∗ 2.62∗ 2.60∗
(0.81) (1.00) (0.99)
Mother some coll. -0.22 -0.36 -0.25
(0.24) (0.30) (0.28)
Mother coll+ 0.17 0.15 0.10
(0.24) (0.29) (0.27)
Child’s age -0.11∗ -0.13∗ -0.14∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Num. children -0.83∗ -0.94∗ -1.06∗
ages 0–5 in HH (0.26) (0.30) (0.34)
φf :
Married 0.95 1.20 1.05
(0.98) (1.19) (1.14)
Father some coll. -0.88∗ -0.94∗ -0.78
(0.39) (0.44) (0.44)
Father coll+ 0.36 0.36 0.43
(0.33) (0.37) (0.38)
Child’s age 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Num. children -0.34 -0.30 -0.48
ages 0–5 in HH (0.30) (0.34) (0.36)
φg:
Married -2.26∗ -2.03 -2.10∗
(0.87) (1.06) (1.02)
Single -2.36∗ -2.31∗ -2.35∗
(0.67) (0.78) (0.77)
Mother some coll. 0.13 0.09 0.12
(0.30) (0.34) (0.34)
Mother coll+ 0.34 0.43 0.32
(0.36) (0.42) (0.41)
Father some coll. -0.49 -0.50 -0.46
(0.34) (0.38) (0.39)
Father coll+ 0.49 0.52 0.62
(0.39) (0.44) (0.45)
Child’s age 0.15∗ 0.17∗ 0.17∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Num. children -0.56 -0.64 -0.83∗
ages 0–5 in HH (0.30) (0.35) (0.39)
Notes: Sample from PSID CDS includes children ages 0–12 from families with no more than 2 children
ages 0–12. Moments using mother (father) time are limited to those with predicted probability of
work at least 0.7 (0.85). Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ statistically sig. at 0.05 level.
Table 16: Variance of Log Investment Expenditure and Price
V ar(lnEot ) V ar(ln pt)
V ar(ln pt)
V ar(lnEot )
Single Mothers 0.70 0.34 0.48
Two-Parent Households 0.57 0.27 0.48
Table 17: Actual and Counterfactual Variance of Log Investment Price
Actual
Equalizing:
Wages
Wages and
Other Prices
Single Mothers 0.34 0.09 0.08
Two-Parent Households 0.27 0.11 0.11
Table 18: Gaps in Investment (% Difference between Non-College and College)
Baseline
Equalizing:
Preferences
Preferences
and Wages
All but
Technology
A. Single Mothers
Total Investment:
Expenditure (E) 58.22 33.27 2.42 0.00
Price (p̄) 24.45 24.45 -6.57 -4.61
Quantity (X) 37.58 15.94 10.79 6.38
Mother’s Time Investment (τm) 24.91 5.26 1.58 -2.28
B. Two-Parent Households
Total Investment:
Expenditure (E) 86.50 71.51 -0.12 0.00
Price (p̄) 86.45 86.45 15.20 14.81
Quantity (X) 8.05 -0.64 -5.76 -4.73
Mother’s Time Investment (τm) 2.56 -5.69 -0.70 -0.40
Table 19: Effects of 10% Reduction in Prices: Single Mothers
Nested CES Cobb-Douglas
Wages Goods Child Care Wages Goods Child Care
A. Change in Investment at Age 5 (%)
Total Expenditure (E) -10.00 0.00 0.00 -10.00 0.00 0.00
Composite Price (p̄) -8.09 -0.50 -1.47 -7.94 -0.56 -1.68
Investment Quantity:
Mother’s Time (τm) -1.42 0.28 1.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Goods (g) -6.10 5.32 1.03 -10.00 11.11 0.00
Child Care (Yc) -4.82 0.36 4.60 -10.00 0.00 11.11
Total (X) -2.27 0.55 1.64 -2.23 0.57 1.70
B. Effects on Age 13 Achievement
100×Log Achievement at age 13 -1.64 0.58 0.98 -1.61 0.59 1.01
Value (% Cons. over Ages 5–12) -1.94 0.70 1.18 -1.90 0.71 1.22
C. Welfare and Distortions over Ages 5–12 (Dollars Discounted to Age 5)
Welfare Gain (EV) -26054 1350 2259 -26354 1536 2588
Distortions:
Relative Investment 59 32 35 163 77 122
Total 753 35 46 851 82 136
Table 20: Effects of 10% Reduction in Prices: Two-Parent Households
Nested CES Cobb-Douglas
Wages Goods Child Care Wages Goods Child Care
A. Change in Investment at Age 5 (%)
Total Expenditure (E) -10.00 0.00 0.00 -10.00 0.00 0.00
Composite Price (p̄) -9.00 -0.31 -0.71 -8.95 -0.34 -0.82
Investment Quantity:
Mother’s Time (τm) -0.77 0.17 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
Father’s Time (τf ) -0.75 0.17 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00
Goods (g) -5.49 5.22 0.51 -10.00 11.11 0.00
Child Care (Yc) -4.16 0.22 4.07 -10.00 0.00 11.11
Total (X) -1.23 0.33 0.84 -1.17 0.34 0.84
B. Effects on Age 13 Achievement
100×Log Achievement at Age 13 -0.82 0.37 0.50 -0.82 0.35 0.49
Value (% Cons. over Ages 5–12) -0.60 0.25 0.34 -0.59 0.25 0.35
C. Welfare and Distortions over Ages 5–12 (Dollars Discounted to Age 5)
Welfare Gain (EV) -73257 1521 2052 -73537 1650 2280
Distortions:
Relative Investment 67 37 34 177 86 117
Total 2015 39 39 2124 89 123
